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THE RELATION  between the demand for money balances and its deter- 
minants  is a fundamental  building  block in most theories  of macroeco- 
nomic  behavior.  Since  it is also a critical  component  in the formulation  of 
monetary  policy, it is not surprising  that  the money-demand  function  has 
been subjected  to extensive  empirical  scrutiny.  The evidence  that  emerged, 
at least  prior  to 1974, suggested  that  only a few factors  (essentially  income 
and interest rates, with due allowance  for lags) were needed  to explain 
adequately  the quarterly  movements  in money demand.  There  were epi- 
sodes that, during their course, gave the impression  that the money- 
demand  function  was shifting.  On the whole,  however,  in the time allowed 
for final  data  revisions  by a "wait  and see" attitude,  the apparent  puzzles 
tended  to clear  up.' 
As has been widely documented,2  the U.S. economy  is once again  ex- 
periencing  an apparent  shift  in the money-demand  function.  In particular, 
when money-demand  functions  that have been successfully  fitted  to pre- 
1974 data are extrapolated  into the post-sample  period,  they consistently 
and significantly  overpredict  actual  money demand.  Furthermore,  as the 
economy  has moved  into the upturn  phase  of the business  cycle, the fore- 
casting  errors  have mushroomed.  While one might  hope that subsequent 
data revisions  could "solve" the present  puzzle, this sanguine  attitude 
seems  unwarranted  for a variety  of reasons. 
First, the sheer magnitudes  of the forecasting  errors  suggest  that im- 
1. Such econometric "benign  neglect"  begs the real problems facing the monetary 
authorities,  who are striving  to make reasonable  policy choices during  these episodes. 
2.  See, for example, Jared Enzler, Lewis Johnson, and John Paulus, "Some Prob- 
lems of Money Demand,"  BPEA, 1:1976, pp. 261-80. 
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plausibly  large data revisions  would be required  to explain current  de- 
velopments  with equations  of the sort  I reported  earlier.  Second,  the large 
forecasting  errors  for 1974-76 coincide  with  unusual  conditions.  Among 
other  things,  that  period  saw  the most  severe  recession  of the postwar  era; 
an extended  bout of double-digit  inflation;  the highest  interest  rates in 
many years; and many institutional  changes in the financial  structure. 
While the failure  of an empirical  macro  relationship  under  such extreme 
conditions  is perhaps  not surprising,  it should  at least  prompt  the question 
of whether  the specification  was adequate  to cope with  them.  In short,  a 
reassessment  of the current  state of knowledge  on the demand  for money 
balances  seems  called  for. 
Outline 
The plan of the paper  is as follows. The next section  reviews  the fore- 
casting  experience  with "conventional"  money-demand  equations,  docu- 
menting  the source  and magnitude  of the recent  errors.  It also considers 
whether  the deterioration  in the money-demand  equation  observed  in the 
current  cyclical  episode  had any counterpart  in previous  periods  of reces- 
sion and recovery.  The second  section  reexamines  the specification  of the 
conventional  equation,  points  out some of its potential  shortcomings,  and 
estimates  a number  of alternative  specifications  of an aggregate  equation 
for demand  deposits  and  currency,  M.  Sectoral  money-demand  functions 
are taken  up in the third  section,  while the fourth  briefly  discusses  recent 
institutional  developments  and presents estimates  of demand  equations 
for time deposits  and M2 (M] plus time deposits). The final section at- 
tempts  to draw  morals  for both specification  and  policy from  the empiri- 
cal results. 
Some  "Conventional"  Equations 
In a previous  paper,  I examined  a number  of specifications  of the de- 
mand  function  for money  balances.3  The simplest,  stemming  from  a trans- 
actions approach,  led to an equation  in which the real stock of money 
3.  Stephen M. Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited," BPEA, 3:1973, 
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balances  was a function  of real gross national  product,  the interest  rates 
on savings  and time deposits at commercial  banks and on commercial 
paper,  and a lagged  dependent  variable.  In logarithmic  form,  this specifi- 
cation  was used to explain  average  quarterly  holdings  of the money  stock 
narrowly  defined,  M1,  over  the  period  1952:2 to 1972:4. A general  finding 
was that this simple  specification  both produced  sensible  parameter  esti- 
mates  and exhibited  sufficient  stability  to be useful  for extrapolation  pur- 
poses. As alluded  to earlier,  the most recent  data  have raised  substantial 
doubts about the stability  of the equation.  As the broad details of this 
doubt  have  already  been  spelled  out,4  the magnitude  of the problem  needs 
only brief  comment. 
The first row of table 1 contains a reestimate  of my earlier  "basic" 
equation  with the sample period extended  four quarters  to the end of 
1973. The present  results  are generally  consistent  with the old ones, al- 
though  the income  elasticity  has declined  somewhat.  Aside from  the addi- 
tional four observations,  the differences  also reflect  the recent  substantial 
revisions  in both the GNP accounts  and the data on the money  stock.5 
While the estimates  look reasonable,  the equation  performs  extremely 
poorly  when extrapolated  beyond  the period  of fit. The summary  results 
are reported  in the last three  columns  of table 1 while the quarterly  fore- 
casts and errors  are given in table 2. In a "static"  simulation,  the equa- 
tion  consistently overpredicts  the  demand for  real money balances 
although  the errors  are  hardly  dramatic.  However,  this is not a very  strin- 
gent test, since a static  simulation  feeds in the actual value of the lagged 
money  stock  in each  period's  prediction,  a procedure  that  tends  to put  the 
equation  back  on track  each  quarter.  A more  relevant  test  is to extrapolate 
the equation  dynamically  by using  the  predicted value  of the lagged  money 
stock  in the prediction  for each  period. 
Quite evidently,  this causes the equation  to exhibit  dramatically  large 
errors.  For the ten-quarter  period as a whole the equation  overpredicts 
by an average  of $13 billion in 1972 prices.  The root-mean-square  error 
(RMSE) is 6.3 percent  and the error  for 1976:2 is a whopping  9.8 per- 
cent, or nearly  $30 billion  in current  prices.  Such  errors  are  hardly  typical 
for post-sample  extrapolations.  The same  specification  estimated  through 
1971:2 and dynamically  extrapolated  for the subsequent  ten quarters 
4.  See, for example, Enzler and others, "Problems  of Money Demand." 
5. The time deposit rate also differs slightly in that the passbook rate is used, but 
this is of little consequence.  See ibid, p. 268. 4) 
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C4 .6 yields an RMSE of 1.0 percent  and a tenth-quarter  error  of 2.6 percent. 
Something  is clearly  amiss in the more recent  period.6 
Disaggregating  M1  into its components,  currency  and  demand  deposits, 
sheds light on the puzzle. The results are again contained  in table 1, 
which  clearly  shows  that  the demand-deposit  equation  is the source  of the 
difficulty.  The currency  equation  tends  to underpredict  somewhat  but on 
the  whole  performs  reasonably  well.  For demand  deposits,  both  the  RMSE 
and the error  for 1976:2 are slightly  larger  in absolute  terms  than the 
M1 results so that the percentage  errors  are about 1?/2 times larger  for 
demand deposits.  For 1976:2 the simulation  error  for demand  deposits 
is an  unprecedented  14.3 percent. 
Although  the focus here  is on simulation  errors,  more  conventional  evi- 
dence yields the same conclusions.  For example, coefficient  estimates 
from separate  demand-deposit  equations  for the two halves  of the sample 
period  look quite different  from one another.  Furthermore,  a formal  test 
for structural  stability  readily  allows  one to reject  that hypothesis. 
In summary,  the relatively  parsimonious  basic  specification  used  earlier 
continues  to perform  satisfactorily  for currency  but is quite  unacceptable 
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Table 2.  Actual and Forecast Values and Simulation  Errors for 
Conventional  Money-Demand  Equation, Quarterly, 1974:1-1976:2 
Billions of 1972 dollars 
Currency  plus demand  deposits,  M1  Error 
Year  and 
quarter  Actual  Forecast  Dynamic  Static 
1974:1  244.4  245.6  -1.2  -1.2 
2  241.2  244.1  -3.0  -1.8 
3  236.7  242.5  -5.8  -3.1 
4  232.3  241.8  -9.5  -4.2 
1975:1  226.9  241.6  -14.7  -6.3 
2  228.6  242.6  -14.0  -1.0 
3  228.7  243.8  -15.1  -4.1 
4  226.1  245.4  -19.4  -7.0 
1976:1  225.9  248.2  -22.3  -5.7 
2  227.9  250.3  -22.3  -3.7 
Source: Based on equation in first row of table 1. Figures are rounded. 
6. The more detailed simulation evidence in my  earlier paper, "Demand for 
Money Revisited," also leads to the same conclusion. It should be noted that the 
earlier results were expressed in  1958 prices so that one should multiply the old 
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for demand  deposits  and  consequently  for M1.  The search  for reasons  for 
the poor  performance  of the demand-deposit  equation  begins  by consider- 
ing the cyclical  characteristics  of the equation. 
CYCLICAL  BEHAVIOR  IN  POSTWAR  RECESSIONS 
The period since early 1974 has included a cyclical downturn  and a 
period of recovery.  Has the poor performance  of the money-demand 
equation  during  the present  cycle any counterpart  during  previous  post- 
war  cycles? 
The dates of the peaks and troughs  of the five cyclical  episodes since 
1952, the beginning  of the sample  period,  are given in the first  two col- 
umns of table 3. For each of these periods I calculated  two types of 
within-sample  dynamic  simulations.  In each case, I started  with the de- 
mand-deposit  specification  in table 1 estimated  over the period 1952:2- 
1973:4.7  In the first  instance  this equation  was used to compute  one long 
dynamic  simulation over the entire sample period. Since doing so ab- 
stracts from initial conditions around  turning  points, I  also ran eight 
separate dynamic simulations,  starting  at each peak and trough. The 
mean errors  and root-mean-square  errors  for these two types of simula- 
tion are shown in table 3 under  the headings  method 1 and method 2, 
respectively. 
For the last three cyclical episodes in the sample  it is possible to do 
out-of-sample  extrapolations  by estimating  the equation  through  1960:1, 
1969:3, and 1973:4 and  simulating  from  peak  to trough.  The simulations 
were restarted  at the trough  and  then  run  for five additional  quarters.  The 
results  for this  case are  given  in table  3 under  method  3. 
These results  show, first, that the mean error  from peak to trough  is 
consistently  negative.  This suggests  that  the basic equation  systematically 
tends to overstate  the demand  for money  in the downturn  of the business 
cycle. Thus, qualitatively,  the experience  from 1973:4 to 1975:1 is not 
new; but, in terms of magnitudes,  it stands  out like a sore thumb.  The 
RMSEs  indicate  that,  for the first  four recessions,  the performance  of the 
equation  is roughly  on a par  with  its behavior  during  the sample  period  as 
a whole.8  Once again the most recent experience  is conspicuous.  For 
7.  The results use the specification  with the Treasury  bill rate instead of the com- 
mercial paper  rate. 
8.  The RMSE for a dynamic simulation over the entire sample period 1952:2- 
1973:4 is $1.5 billion in 1972 prices. L  t  ==ooNS  no~~~~~~~~~~~~~r 
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the quarters  following  a trough  the situation  is mixed. One might  expect 
the equation  to understate  money demand  in the upswing  and while it 
does this in two cases, it overstates  the demand  in two others and the 
fifth is a standoff.  The mean error  after 1975:1 again  stands  out as does 
the RMSE for this period, because the RMSEs for the four earlier  re- 
covery  periods  are  not particularly  large. 
On balance,  while  there  is some evidence  of systematic  errors  in earlier 
cycles  one cannot  escape  the conclusion  that  the  present  period  is unusual. 
Some  Alternative  Specifications 
Of necessity,  empirical  macroeconomic  relationships  tend to be prac- 
tical compromises  between  theory  and data. Consequently,  estimated  re- 
lationships  are typically  caricatures  that obviously abstract  from many 
features  of potential  importance.  The failure of new data to fit well to 
historically  estimated  relationships  is thus hardly  surprising.  This section 
first  briefly  reviews  the underpinnings  of the simple  money-demand  speci- 
fication  estimated  above. It then examines  the possible shortcomings  of 
the basic specification  and  reports  estimates  for alternative  specifications. 
A  CONVENTIONAL  MODEL 
The conventional  transactions  view of money  balances  results  in a de- 
mand function that relates the quantity  of money balances (M)  to  a 
measure  of the volume  of transactions  (T),  an interest  rate  on a riskless 
asset (r), and  a "brokerage  charge"  (b), or transactions  cost of converting 
from  the riskless  asset  to money.  The simplest  expression  of this relation- 
ship  is the so-called  square-root  law: 
(1)  bT 
2r 
Equation  1 is typically  put in real  terms  by rewriting  it as 
(2)  M  ____ 
2r 
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Empirical  implementation  of equation  2 obviously  requires  the choice 
of some observed  variables  as counterparts  to its theoretical  constructs. 
In the previous  section this was accomplished  by use of real GNP as a 
measure  of T/P  and of the rates  on time deposits  and commercial  paper 
as measures  of r, and by assuming  that real transactions  costs, b/P,  are 
constant.  In each instance,  however, other choices are possible and, in 
view of the poor performance  of the equation  in recent  periods,  should 
be explored.  But first  two general  issues  of specification  and the question 
of the strategy  to be pursued  require  attention. 
PARTIAL  ADJUSTMENT 
In most empirical  work, especially  with quarterly  data, equation  2 is 
not estimated  directly.  Rather,  it is used as a basis  for defining  "desired" 
money balances  toward  which actual  money balances  are posited to ad- 
just. More  particularly,  assuming  that  real transactions  costs are constant 
and denoting  transactions  by y, following equation  2 one can write the 
desired  stock  of real  money  balances  (m*) as 
(3)  Inm*  =  a,+a2Inyt+a3Inrt. 
Given  equation  3, there  are  a number  of ways  one can specify  an adjust- 
ment  equation.  Two  possibilities  are 
(4)  In mt-  In mt-,  =  Y  (In m*-lIn  mt-1) 
(5)  In Mt-  In Mt-, = -y  (In  M*-lIn  M,-,), 
with M* =  m  *Pt. 
Combining  equations  3 and  5 yields 
(6)  In (  )  =  C1+  C2  ln Yt  +  c3  In rt +  C4 In  Mt-, 
while combining  3 and 4 yields the same  equation  except  that the lagged 
dependent  variable  enters  as mtil = Mt-,IPt-l. 
The logical  difference  between  the two cases is that equation  5 implies 
that a reduction  of the lagged  value of the nominal  money stock due to 
rising  prices is subject  to partial  or lagged adjustment  while equation  4 
implies that such a reduction  is subject  to immediate adjustment.  Al- 
though  in the previous  section  and in most of my earlier  work  I relied  on 
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use the nominal-adjustment  model  of equation  5.9  When  this  modification 
is made to the M, equation  of table 1, nothing  dramatic  happens,  but the 
post-sample  RMSE and the error  for 1976:2 of the resulting  equation  are 
25 percent smaller. Since, in any event, this specification  makes more 
sense a priori,  it will be adopted  in what  follows.'0 
POPULATION  DEFLATION 
The second general  issue of specification  concerns deflation  by popu- 
lation. A priori, this seems desirable,  at least for household  money de- 
mand,  although  the number  of households  might  be a better  deflator.  For 
total money holdings  the issue is less clear-cut  but even here  a per capita 
basis seems to make sense. Despite this presumption,  after some crude 
tests made  in earlier  work,  I rejected  deflation.  Since  at least one of these 
tests was flawed  I reexamined  this issue by estimating  a per capita  equa- 
tion, adding  the logarithm  of population  as a separate  variable.  If the 
per capita  specification  is appropriate,  the population  variable  should  be 
insignificantly  different  from zero and, with one marginal  exception,  the 
null hypothesis  was accepted  for a variety  of specifications  of the other 
variables.  Consequently,  all of the results  in this section  will use the per 
capita  nominal-adjustment  specification.'1 
STRATEGY 
The rest  of this  section  explores  alternative  specifications  of the money- 
demand  relationship.  The goal, of course, is to see whether  a plausible 
respecification  of the conventional  equation  can better  explain  the recent 
9.  In fact, as noted in my earlier paper, "Demand  for Money Revisited"  (p. 61  1), 
it is possible to interpret  my original results as confirming  the desirability  of specifi- 
cation 5 relative to 4. 
10. One effect worth noting is that the speed of adjustment  declines somewhat 
with the nominal-adjustment  model. Thus the adjustment  to price changes, rather 
than being instantaneous,  may in fact be slower than that to nominal income changes, 
perhaps because of  slowness in adjusting the "perceived"  price level to the actual 
one. A model of this sort is considered  briefly  below. 
11. The equation used in the MPS (MIT-Penn-Social  Science Research Council) 
model and the specification reported in Enzler and others, "Problems of  Money 
Demand," use as a dependent variable the ratio of  demand deposits to nominal 
income and include as independent  variables real per capita income and the ratio of 
lagged deposits to current income. A little algebra reveals that this is equivalent to 
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behavior  of money  demand.  Since  care  is needed  in making  the judgment, 
the  strategy  to be followed  is worth  some  attention. 
In the first  instance,  all estimation  was carried  out over  a sample  period 
1952:2-1973:4.  Because this period predates  the difficulties  with the 
money-demand  equation,  one can judge whether  specification  changes 
that improve  the predictions  for recent quarters  could have been antici- 
pated given the information  available  at the time.'2  I then dynamically 
simulated  those equations  with promising  in-sample  characteristics  over 
the ten out-of-sample  quarters  ending  in 1976:2. The equations  were  also 
estimated  over the entire  period through  the middle of 1976 and some 
subperiods,  and  a test  for stability  was  performed  because  the  conventional 
specification  was not stable  over  the entire  period. 
However, these procedures  were not quite enough. Even the accep- 
tance of some particular  modified  specification  (in a conventional  sta- 
tistical  sense) based on data  up to 1973 does not mean  that it should  be 
used for extrapolation  purposes.  The question  remained:  How did the 
proposed  specification  perform  in a series  of post-sample  dynamic  simu- 
lations prior to 1974? As a consequence,  several  of the relatively  most 
successful  results  to be presented  below were subjected  to this backward- 
looking  scrutiny. 
As a final word of introduction,  all the results  in this section pertain 
to aggregate  concepts  such as M: or total demand  deposits.'3  Results  for 
sectoral  money holdings  will be described  in the next section. 
MEASURES  OF  TRANSACTIONS 
As indicated  above,  researchers  have often  used  real  GNP as a measure 
of transactions.  But the apparent  success  of this variable  rests  on a num- 
ber of tenuous  assumptions.  For one, GNP ignores  transfers,  and trans- 
actions  in financial  assets and in existing  goods, all of wllich  may result 
in transactions  demand  for money. For another,  GNP involves  imputa- 
tions  that  may  require  no transactions  balances.  Probably  more  important, 
12. This, of course, begs the question  of data revisions. 
13. As the coefficient estimates and t-statistics  were quite similar for the two ag- 
gregates,  I present the results for M1 only. However, as is already evident in table 1, 
despite similar parameter estimates for a  given specification, the demand-deposit 
equation resulted in absolutely larger simulation errors in virtually all cases. As a 
consequence,  the summary statistics for the demand-deposit  simulations  will also be 
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GNP nets out intermediate  transactions  so that  using  it implicitly  assumes 
that total transactions  are proportional  to GNP. Keynes,  in fact, looked 
with considerable  skepticism  on the notion of the income velocity of 
money, suggesting  that "it is as [if one] were to divide the passenger- 
miles  travelled  in an hour  by passengers  in trams  by the aggregate  number 
of passengers  in trams  and trains  and  to call the result  a 'velocity.'  "14 
The  relationship  between intermediate  and final transactions  may 
change  for a number  of reasons.  First,  changes  in the degree  of integration 
of firms  may alter  the relationship.  In addition,  both secular  and cyclical 
changes  in the composition  of output  may affect  the volume  of intermedi- 
ate transactions  at any  given  level of GNP.15 
Confronted  with the potential  shortcomings  of GNP as a transactions 
variable, investigators  have recently turned to  other measures. Most 
prominent  among  these have been bank debits,  which  measure  the value 
of checks  written  on privately  held demand  deposits  at commercial  banks. 
Since  they  reflect  payments  for intermediate  goods, financial  transactions, 
and existing  assets, on the face of it, debits may be a more appropriate 
transactions  variable.16  The secular  rise in the ratio of debits to GNP 
shown in table 4 suggests  that if debits  form  the appropriate  transactions 
variable,  the use of GNP would involve  a misspecification.  Furthermore, 
as has been reported  by Enzler  and his coauthors,  debits  appear  unchar- 
acteristically  low relative  to GNP in the most  recent  recovery  period,  just 
when  money  demand  weakened;  this  finding  suggests  that  debits  may  have 
something  to contribute  to an empirical  explanation  of money  demand. 
But, are debits necessarily  a fully appropriate  transactions  variable? 
Their virtue is their comprehensiveness,  but in that also lies some of 
their defects.  In particular,  as is often argued,  increasingly  sophisticated 
cash-management  practices  have tended  to reduce  the volume of money 
balances  necessary  to support  any given  level of economic  activity.  How- 
ever-and  this is the crux of the difficulty-such economizing  has been 
brought  about in part by increasing  the volume of debits. This increase 
reflects,  among  other  things,  transfers  of balances  among  a firm's  multiple 
14. John Maynard  Keynes, A Treatise  on Money, vol. 2 (Harcourt,  Brace, 1930), 
p. 25. Italics added. 
15. It is, of course, possible that, even aside from intermediate  transactions,  the 
composition of output may have a direct influence  on money-demand  behavior. 
16. Charles Lieberman  has argued this proposition in a series of papers. See, for 
example, "The Transactions Demand for Money and Technological Change,"  Re- 
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Table  4. Selected  Measures  of Bank  Debits,  Selected  Years 
Dollar amounts  in billions 
Measure  1950  1960  1970  1975 
Debits 
Total  1,552.1  3,180.6  10,221.3  22,998.4 
Excluding  New York City banks  985.6  1,958.1  5,717.3  12,184.3 
Nominal GNP  286.2  506.0  982.4  1,516.3 
Ratio, debits  to GNP 
Total  5.42  6.29  10.40  15.17 
Excluding  New York City banks  3.44  3.87  5.82  8.04 
Sources: Federal  Reserve Board; Survey of Current  Business, relevant issues. 
accounts.  Moreover,  both firms  and individuals  may increase  debits  by 
expanding  their purchases  and sales of financial  assets simultaneously 
with  attempts  to reduce  money  holdings.  Debits  data  can also be distorted 
by the huge and highly  volatile volume of transactions  generated  by se- 
curities dealers, brokers,  and the like.'7 Since many of these financial 
transactions  take place in the New York City  banks,  some see debits  ex- 
cluding  New York City-also  shown in table 4-as  a better measure. 
Even  with this modification,  the potential  logical  shortcoming  of a debits- 
based transactions  variable remains. Clearly, it should be used with 
caution."8 
Two other types of transactions  variables reflect some of the same 
factors  as a debits  variable:  a weighted-GNP  variable  and a wealth  vari- 
able. As for the first,  Enzler  and his coauthors  have proposed  a variable 
in which "residential  construction  received a weight of  1.5, exports 
received a weight of 0.5, and government  purchases  of labor services 
a weight  of zero, while all other GNP expenditure  categories  received  a 
weight of  1.0."19 The basic idea is to reflect  intermediate  transactions 
17. The most complete discussion of debits is contained in George Garvy and 
Martin R. Blyn, The Velocity of Money (rev. ed., Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 1970). As an extreme example, a 1959 survey they report revealed that gov- 
ernment securities dealers had a turnover of more than 11,000 per year, or about 
50 per working day. 
18. There is also a practical  problem in that forecasting  or policy analysis is con- 
cerned  with GNP or its components.  Thus a money-demand  function based on debits 
requires an explanation of debits in terms of GNP. An analysis of debits should be 
viewed as a possible step in analyzing the behavior of money demand rather than 
the end product of ultimate interest. 
19. Enzler and others, "Problems  of Money Demand," p. 278. The construction 
of this variable  was indirectly  motivated by appeal to the debits data. ~~~~~~~~~~~0  C  C;  Cv  c,,  C_  C'  sr 
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more  satisfactorily,  although  it is difficult  to know  what  the  proper  weights 
should  be. 
Wealth,  or net worth,  has had a long history  in money-demand  func- 
tions. Some  writers,  in fact, prefer  it to income as the basic scale  variable 
in the demand  for money. Alternatively,  this variable  can be used-in 
level or first-difference  form-in  conjunction  with another  transactions 
variable  such as income in the hope that it will capture  the effects of 
financial  transactions  on money  demand. 
EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
The basic equation-5.1-using  real GNP as a transactions  variable, 
is reported  in the first  row of table 5. It has a post-sample  RMSE of 4.8 
percent (expressed  as a percent  of the mean of the dependent  variable 
over the extrapolation  period) and a 1976:2 error of 8.7 percent.  This, 
then,  is the starting  point  for the analysis.  Equation  5.2 reports  the results 
obtained  by using  debits  outside  of New York City as a transactions  vari- 
able. Taken  by itself, this is clearly  a step in the wrong  direction.20  How- 
ever, equations  5.3 and 5.4 suggest  that the debits  data can help explain 
the  puzzle.  Equation  5.3 includes  the deviation  of actual  debits  from  debits 
predicted  by a regression  on GNP and time.2'  When actual debits fall 
short  of predictions,  money  demand  should  be lower  and  that  is precisely 
what  the negative  coefficient  for this  equation  shows.  The  variable  also  im- 
proves the simulation  performance  of the equation, although  not dra- 
matically.  A different  use of the debits data in equation  5.4 produces  a 
slightly  bigger  improvement.  That equation  adds the change  in debits  to 
the basic equation and it gets a significant  and appropriately  positive 
coefficient.  Relative  to equation  5.1, both  the RMSE  and  the 1976:2 error 
improve  by about  25 percent. 
Equation  5.5 reports  the results  obtained  with  the weighted-GNP  vari- 
able  which,  when  substituted  for real  GNP, leads  to only a slight  improve- 
ment in simulation  performance.22  The final equation  in the table, 5.6, 
20.  Choosing the proper price deflator for a debits variable presents a problem. 
Having little imagination, I stuck with the implicit GNP deflator used in the other 
equations. 
21. The equation related "real"  debits to real GNP and was estimated over the 
same sample period as the other equations-from  1952:2 to 1973:4. 
22. Following the general spirit of the weighted-GNP variable, I also estimated 
some equations using measures of the composition of GNP, along with GNP itself. 
These were entered as "share"  variables-that  is, the ratio of an expenditure  cate- 698  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
uses the level of net worth  in conjunction  with real GNP. In my earlier 
paper  net worth  was not significant  in this  context,  but recasting  the equa- 
tion in per capita terms  apparently  permits  both GNP and net worth  to 
attain  statistical  significance.  As is evident  from the table, the net-worth 
variable  reduces  the simulation  error  slightly  in the post-1973 period.23 
The upshot  of these various  attempts  is that real GNP works  about  as 
well as any basic transactions  variable  I could find, but that the debits 
and net-worth  data do appear  to contribute  something.24  However,  the 
size of the remaining  error suggests  the need to continue  reexamination 
of the specification  of the money-demand  function. 
TRANSACTIONS  COSTS  AND  RATCHET  EFFECTS 
As noted above, the brokerage  fee or transactions  cost plays a promi- 
nent role in the theoretical  derivation  of optimal  money holdings.  The 
notion covers a multitude  of sins since it is meant to account  for any 
sort of cost of converting  from "the"  earning  asset to money-the  cost 
of "trips  to the bank,"  penalties  for premature  withdrawal  of funds, or 
explicit brokerage  charges. By assuming  that the net brokerage  cost is 
gory to GNP. In many cases I was able to reject the hypothesis that these variables 
did not matter as a group but the individual  coefficients  were often not significant  or 
had questionable  signs. 
23. When the change in net worth was used in conjunction  with GNP, both were 
statistically significant  but the simulation error was essentially unchanged  from that 
for  equation 5.1.  A  considerably more  dramatic improvement in  the post-1973 
simulation performance  is achieved if the income variable is simply replaced by the 
net-worth variable. This serves to reduce the RMSE to 1.8 percent and the error in 
1976:2 to 3.9 percent. Lest one leap to conclusions, however, this specification  does 
quite poorly in the kinds of tests summarized  in tables 7 and 8 below, and is not a 
serious candidate  for explaining  money demand in the years before the recent shorf- 
falls. 
24. While these variables perform in qualitatively the same way for demand de- 
posits as for Ma, as indicated in the last two columns of table 5, they improve the 
simulation performance  less. Also the demand-deposit  errors in table 5 are not con- 
sistent with those reported in Enzler and others, "Problems of  Money Demand," 
table 7. This inconsistency  does not stem primarily  from the different  sample periods 
used, but from an arithmetic error that apparently crept into the calculation of 
simulation errors in that paper. Thus, while the authors report a simulation error in 
their basic equation 7.1 of 8.5 percent in 1976:  1, for their sample period the correct 
estimate is 11.5 percent. They also report a corresponding  improvement  to 7.3 per- 
cent with their proposed transactions variable, while the corrected number is 11.4 
percent,  or a miniscule improvement. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  699 
fixed  in real terms-an  exercise  in handwaving-such costs are typically 
ignored  in empirical  work.  Quite  recently,  numerous  institutional  develop- 
ments that appear  to have reduced  transactions  costs have called this 
assumption  into serious  question.  Unfortunately,  translating  institutional 
developments  into a measurable  brokerage  fee is not an easy task.25 
The impact  of transactions  costs on money demand  may also change 
if expected  shifts in interest  rates and other factor prices influence  the 
choice of cash-management  techniques.  This point has been argued  by 
Duesenberry  and more recently  by Quick  and Paulus.26  The basic idea is 
that once people recognize  that active cash management  involves some 
fixed cost and also become  familiar  with new techniques  through  "learn- 
ing-by-doing,"  the transactions  technology (for example,  as symbolized 
by b in equation  2)  plausibly  may be considered  a decision  variable  of 
the money  holder.  Furthermore,  once a new technology  is adopted,  firms 
and  individuals  will not necessarily  abandon  it should  current  or expected 
interest  rates  fall. Thus, there  may be a ratchet  effect  in the demand  for 
money. 
One simple  way to allow  for this effect  is to introduce  "previous  peak" 
variables  for interest  rates or income or both.27  The first  two equations 
of table 6 report  the results  obtained  when  these  variables  were  separately 
added to the basic specification  of equation 5.1. In equation 6.1 the 
income-ratchet  variable  is entered  as the ratio of GNP to previous  peak 
GNP and it obtains  an appropriately  positive  coefficient  with a t-statistic 
of 1.9. Thus, given GNP, the higher  the previous  peak GNP the lower 
money  demand  will be. Comparison  of table 6 with  table  5 indicates  that 
the RMSE  for M, is reduced  from 4.8 percent  to 3.1 percent.  The previ- 
25. See the fourth section for a brief discussion  of the relevant  institutional  devel- 
opments and a partial assessment of their quantitative impact on the demand for 
money. 
26. James S. Duesenberry, "The Portfolio Approach to the Demand for Money 
and Other Assets," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 45  (February 1963, 
Supplement), pp. 9-3 1, and Perry D. Quick and John D. Paulus, "Financial  Innova- 
tion and the Transactions  Demand for Money" (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Banking Section, n.d.; processed). 
27.  Income is  potentially relevant since, in  the  simple Baumol-Tobin model, 
whether an individual will be an active money manager, or at a corner solution in 
which all transactions  balances are held in cash, depends in part on both his income 
and the interest  rate he faces. Previous-peak  variables are certainly not the only way 
to capture  these effects and, in fact, one should probably allow for some dampening 
in these peak variables. However, attempts  to allow for dampening  made little differ- 
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ous peak rate on commercial  paper  is used in equation  6.2 and it both 
obtains  a significantly  negative  coefficient  and improves  the simulations. 
Equations  6.3 through  6.5 combine  these ratchet  variables  with some 
of the debits variables  from table 5. Equation 6.5, which simulates  the 
best of the three, has driven the RMSE down to 2.0 percent and the 
error  in 1976:2 down to 4.1 percent,  a reduction  of nearly  60 percent 
from  equation  5.1. A substantial  further  reduction  is achieved  in equation 
6.6 with the substitution  of a linear  functional  form for the peak interest 
rate. Quick  and  Paulus  argue  in favor  of this specification,  suggesting  that 
money  managers  are more sensitive  to absolute  than  to proportional  dif- 
ferences,28  and this specification  works quite well in the post-sample 
period.  Indeed, the 1976:2 error  of $5 billion (or 2.2 percent) is only 
one-quarter  that of the original  equation  5.1 and is fairly  respectable  in 
absolute  terms  as well.29 
On the face of it, then, this approach  has made a substantial  dent in 
explaining  the recent puzzle in money demand.  However, the strategy 
outlined  earlier  suggests  a more careful  retrospective  look at the leading 
contenders-after consideration  of whether  further  improvements  would 
flow from modifying  the remaining  potential  shortcomings  of the basic 
equation. 
INTEREST  RATES 
As with other  variables,  the appropriate  interest  rate poses a question. 
Among the possibilities  are the commercial  paper  rate, the Treasury  bill 
rate, various savings and time deposit rates, some longer-term  security 
rates, and perhaps  even an implicit  rate on demand  deposits.  However, 
given the size of the puzzle to be explained,  it is hard  to foresee much 
payoff  from trying  various  interest  rates,  and indeed  I got none. Simula- 
tion performances  of equations  using alternatively  the commercial  paper 
rate and the Treasury  bill rate were virtually  identical.  The same is true 
for comparisons  of several  different  variables  for time and  savings  deposit 
rates. As for longer-term  rates, the corporate  bond rate proved  to be, if 
28.  For a brief discussion of the functional form see ibid., appendix. 
29.  As in table 5, the improvement in the error in the corresponding  demand- 
deposit equation (not shown)  is not nearly as marked. For example, the demand- 
deposit version of equation 6.6 still has an RMSE of 3.2 percent and a 1976:2 error 
of 6.7 percent, compared with 7.6 percent and 13.3 percent, respectively, for equa- 
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anything,  inferior  to either  of the short-term  market  rates.  Finally,  I made 
one crude attempt  at relaxing  the constant-interest-elasticity  assumption 
implicit  in a linear-logarithmic  specification  by adding  the square  of the 
logarithm  of the interest rate to the basic equation.  In principle,  this 
specification  is rich enough  to allow for a higher  elasticity  at low interest 
rates  (which  is often  alleged  to be the case) but  these  variables  were  never 
significant. 
ESTIMATION  TECHNIQUES 
Another possible shortcoming  of the results presented above arises 
because  they are based on single-equation  estimation  techniques.  While 
I had earlier  found  correction  for simultaneity  to be of little  consequence, 
it seemed worth checking  out again. However,  as before, estimation  by 
two-stage  least squares  with either  a money  magnitude  or an interest  rate 
on the left-hand side produced  no surprises.  In fact, the interest-rate 
equation  corresponding  to 5.1, when solved for M1,  produced  no better 
simulation  than the basic equation.  And when simulated  for the interest 
rate it produced  equivalently  large errors  in the out-of-sample  period. 
A related  issue concerns  the generality  of the lag structure  used above. 
The simple stock-adjustment  model implies a potentially  restrictive  geo- 
metric  lag pattern,  which I relaxed both by including,  lagged values of 
income and interest  rates (and a two-period  lag for money) and by esti- 
mating some polynomial distributed-lag  versions. However, neither 
method improved  on the simulation  performance  of the basic equation 
or of any  of a number  of the  variants  reported  above. 
PRICE  EFFECTS 
Alternative  ways  of getting  prices  into the equation  constituted  the final 
variation  tested.  The implications  of a nominal-  versus  a real-adjustment 
model  were  discussed  earlier;  but given  the exceptional  inflation  of recent 
years, further  alternatives,  employing  proxies for expected inflation  in 
the money-demand  function,  were also pursued.  In one attempt,  I used 
a distributed  lag of current  and past rates of inflation  both in a stock- 
adjustment  version and in an equation  that used polynomial  distributed 
lags on income and interest  rates as well. When  these versions  were esti- 
mated over 1952:2-1973:4, the inflation  variable  always  obtained  a sig- Stephen  M. Goldfeld  703 
nficantly negative  coefficient,  but the post-1973 simulation  performance 
was essentially  unchanged. 
In a further  attempt,  money  holders  were assumed  to adjust  to a "per- 
ceived"  price  level, P*, which  need not in the short  run equal  the actual 
price  level.  The  model  can  be derived  as follows. 
Take  the  nominal-adjustment  model, 
(5)  ln M,  -  In M,-  =  y (In M*  -  In Mt-), 
but instead of assuming  that the desired  nominal  stock is equal to the 
desired  real stock times the actual  price level-that  M* =  m*Pt-posit 
that M*  =  m*Pt  *.  The  desired real  stock  is  also  assumed to  depend 
onP*,  asin 
(7)  ln m* =  a +  b  ln  (t)  +  c  n r, 
where  Yt is nominal  income  and  rt is "the"  interest  rate.  These  equations 
can  be combined  to yield 
(8) In Mt = 'ya  +  (1-'y) ln Mt-, +  yb  ln Yt +  yc  ln rt +  y(1-b) In  P*. 
Equation  8 is in nominal  terms but, with P* =  P, in the long run, it re- 
duces  to an appropriately  homogeneous  equation. 
Completing  the story calls for a proxy for Pt . Perhaps  the simplest  is 
In 
(g)  l~~~~~n  P*-  wi  In Pt-i,  (9)  lnt 
i=4o 
where w is the relative weight on  the lagged price level. Substituting 
equation  9 into 8 gives an equation  one can estimate  and I tried a few 
versions.  A typical  equation  over  the sample  period  1952:  2-1973:4  (with 
n =  2)  is 
lnMt  =0.152+0.1581n  Y,-O.  01lnRTBt-0.0341nRTD, 
(0.6)  (4.6)  (4.4)  (3.2) 
+  0.785  In M,,  +  0.111  In  Pt -  0.189  In P,1  +  0.117  InPt2, 
(1 1.3)  (1I.  1)  (1 .4)  (1I.  1) 
where  RTB is the Treasury  bill rate  and  RTD is the rate  on time deposits, 
and the numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  Although  I did not im- 
pose any  constraints  on the price  coefficients,  wi, their  sum  is not far  from 
the "right"  long-run  value.  The equation  produces  an RMSE  in the post- 
sample  period of 3.3 percent  and a 1976:2 error  of 6.1 percent,  better 
than either  the previous  nominal-  or the real-adjustment  model. Unfor- 704  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
tunately,  however,  the pattern  of coefficients  on the price  variables  is a bit 
difficult  to rationalize.80  Constraining  the price  coefficients  to fit an Almon 
lag posed the same problem.  Thus, while this more flexible  approach  to 
modeling  the impact  of prices  shows  promise,  it hardly  solves the puzzle. 
One other "cure"  for the money-demand  mystery  has recently  been 
advanced.  Sinai has suggested  that the basic specification  suffers  most 
because  the assumption  of a unitary  price elasticity  is no longer appro- 
priate.31  In my earlier  paper  I could  not reject  the hypothesis  of a unitary 
elasticity,  but when Sinai  adds  the logarithm  of the price  level to my old 
basic equation  extended  to the end of 1975, it appears  that  the hypothesis 
is rejected  and  that  the elasticity  is significantly  less than  unity.32  One  pos- 
sible explanation  for this result is that real transactions  costs have de- 
clined over this period. Since the basic specification  implicitly  assumes 
that these costs are constant,  their decline obviously  would produce a 
price elasticity  of less than unity. The solution is a proper  measure  of 
transactions  costs rather  than a distortion  of the price coefficient.  While 
finding  one is not an easy matter,  one crude test of the acceptability  of 
the lower estimated  price coefficient  is whether  the same results  obtain 
with one of the improved  specifications  given in table 6. The answer  is 
a resounding  no. For example,  when the logarithm  of the price level is 
added  to equation  6.5, it gets a coefficient  of 0.003 and a t-statistic  of 
0. 15. This evidence  simply  confirms  the rather  strong  a priori  case against 
a nonunitary  elasticity  in the long run. In short,  this is not a solution to 
the puzzle. 
After all these attempts,  then, the results  in table 6 stand  as the best I 
can offer.  It is now time to see how good they  really  are. 
A  CLOSER  LOOK  AT  THE  RESULTS 
The several plausible specifications  of the money-demand  function, 
which extrapolate  reasonably  well in the most recent period, need ex- 
30. The coefficients on the price variables curiously imply that prices approxi- 
mately enter as a constant times [in (Pt/Pt-1)  -  ln (Pt-1/Pt2)],  which is the change 
in the rate of inflation. 
31. Allen Sinai, "The Money Supply Puzzle: An Econometric Analysis" (pro- 
cessed). 
32. This result is certainly correct, as I found by adding log P to equation 5.1 
estimated through 1976:2,  although it should be noted that the t-statistic is con- 
siderably  larger for my original real-adjustment  equation. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  705 
amination.  One way to address  this  issue  is to ask  how the various  specifi- 
cations  would have performed  had they been used in earlier  periods  for 
short-term  forecasting  or in somewhat  longer-term  extrapolations.  To 
examine  the short-term  forecasting  properties,  a number  of specifications 
were estimated  from 1952:2 to an endpoint  that was first  set at 1966:2 
and subsequently  extended  four quarters  at a time. The detailed  results 
will not be reported;  but all of the "new"  variables  examined  in table 6 
above-the  marginal-debits  variables,  previous  peak interest  rates, and 
income-were  virtually  always statistically  significant  in the various  re- 
gressions.  That this is not a sufficient  basis for preferring  these  modifica- 
tions is indicated  in table 7, which reports  the RMSEs  for four-quarter 
post-sample  forecasts.  While scorekeeping  with these numbers  is not an 
unambiguous  matter,  for either five or six of the eight stopping  points 
before the recent  puzzle  set in, the basic specification  of equation  5.1, or 
the version  with  net worth,  equation  5.6, outperformed  the various  speci- 
fications  from  table 6. The net-worth  version  is, in fact, better  than  equa- 
tion 5.1 in seven  out of the eight  years.33 
Another  result apparent  in table 7 is that the linear  form of the peak 
Table 7.  Root-Mean-Square  Errors for Four-Quarter  Extrapolations 
for Alternative  Specifications  of Money Demand, 
1966:2-1975:2 Endpointsa 
Billions  of 1972 dollars 
Estimation  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation 
endpoint  form  form  form  form  form 
(year  and quarter)  5.1  5.6  6.2  6.5  6.6 
1966:2  6.2  6.0  2.7  2.8  2.0 
1967:2  2.1  2.0  3.5  3.8  4.1 
1968:2  1.2  0.6  4.0  3.6  4.3 
1969:2  2.5  1.5  1.6  1.9  3.6 
1970:2  0.7  1.0  1.8  1.9  2.0 
1971:2  3.9  3.7  2.2  2.6  3.0 
1972:2  0.8  0.5  1.4  1.6  1.5 
1973:2  0.8  0.4  1.0  1.2  2.0 
1974:2  6.2  4.5  4.5  1.8  0.8 
1975:2  6.9  6.9  7.3  8.2  7.7 
Sources: Based on tables 5 and 6. 
a.  Each sample period begins with  1952:2 and has a terminal point that moves systematically from 
1966:2 in steps of four quarters. 
33.  The perhaps conspicuous absence of a net-worth variable in table 6 reflects 
the fact that net worth turns insignificant  if used along with the ratchet variables. 706  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
interest  rate, which  performed  so well in the extrapolations  of equation 
6.6, estimated  through  1973:4, is inferior  to the logarithmic  version  prior 
to 1974.24  This conclusion  is even more strongly  reinforced  by the data 
in table 8, which  reports  summary  statistics  for simulations  that  begin  in 
various  years and run forward  to the end of 1973. The equation  based 
on the linear  peak rate (6.6)  clearly extrapolates  distinctly  worse than 
the one based on the logarithmic  form (6.5).  However,  the latter  is still 
not as good as the basic specification  of equation  5.1. 
What  this suggests  to me is that the equations  in table 6 provide  only 
a mirage  of an explanation  of the recent  puzzle.  More particularly,  with 
data  prior  to 1974, either  the conventional  equation,  5.1, or the equation 
with  net worth  added,  5.6, is clearly  preferable  to the best of the alterna- 
tives  in table  6. 
Furthermore,  decomposing  the post-1973  errors,  as table  7 does,  makes 
clear that the modified  equations  are somewhat  less impressive  relative 
to the basic equation  even in the most recent  period. Notably,  while the 
modified  equations  do better  for the year 1974:3-1975:2,  they do worse 
for the last  four  quarters  shown,  ending  in 1976:2. 
Not surprisingly,  a Chow test on the last four observations  allows one 
to reject  the hypothesis  of stability  for equations  6.5 and  6.6.86 
How should these various  findings  be interpreted?  Perhaps  the puzzle 
remains  because  I simply  have not been clever enough,  and I have some 
sympathy  with  this view. In particular,  the uniform  statistical  significance 
of the peak-interest-rate  variable  and  the various  debits  variables  suggests 
that  something  systematic  is going  on above  and  beyond  the conventional 
specification.  While I have exploited  these regularities  to some extent, 
there  may  yet be a better  way  to handle  them.  Perhaps  the  money-demand 
function  has truly  shifted.  If this is the case, a number  of important  ques- 
tions  must  be answered.  The  first  order  of business,  however,  is to examine 
34. The individual regressions  that lie behind table 7 reveal a systematic decline 
over time in the coefficient of the peak interest rate when entered in linear fashion, 
thus suggesting  a functional misspecification. 
35.  Of course, as noted above, this is not true for simulations starting  in 1974:1. 
What this points up, in part, is the sensitivity of simulation exercises to initial con- 
ditions, especially for short forecasting horizons. This, in itself, should make one 
wary of basing any firm conclusions on simulations  in a particular  sample period. 
36.  This shift does not show up if one splits the entire period in half and does a 
conventional stability test on the equations  in table 6. However, a crude examination 
of the subperiod equations suggests that something different  is going on in the two 
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a third possibility-that  aggregation  over behaviorally  diverse sectors 
may  induce  the kind  of instability  observed. 
Sectoral  Disaggregation  of Money  Demand 
Like all economic  aggregates,  total money  demand  reflects  the actions 
of diverse groups,  each of whom,  in principle,  may have a different  be- 
havioral  function. In view of the nature  of the results obtained  in the 
previous section, disaggregation  into more homogeneous behavioral 
groups  seems  worthwhile. 
Unfortunately,  as I discovered  in earlier  work, this is easier  said than 
done. One problem  is data. Two basic sources yield sectoral splits of 
money holdings,  the complete  set of sectoral  accounts  contained  in the 
Federal  Reserve  Board's  flow-of-funds  accounts  (FOF), and  its Demand 
Deposit Ownership  Survey (DDOS).37 The FOF data are available 
quarterly  since 1952 and permit  a breakdown  of money holdings  into 
five major sectors: household,  nonfinancial  business,  financial  business, 
state and local government,  and the rest of the world. The DDOS data 
are available  monthly,  but unfortunately  only since 1970 so that  they are 
not directly  very  useful  for the type of analysis  pursued  here.38  Indirectly, 
however,  they  may  be valuable  since  they appear  to have  permitted  a sub- 
stantial  improvement  in the breakdown  between  the business  and house- 
hold sectors  in the  FOF accounts. 
Some selected  data  from the most recent  revision  are given in table 9. 
Comparing  these  with "old"  data  for 1972 indicates  that  money  holdings 
of business  for that year  have been revised  upward  by nearly  $20 billion 
while those  of households  have  been marked  down  by $15 billion.39 
37.  One important  difference  between the two sources is that the FOF data com- 
prise currency plus demand deposits while the DDOS data cover demand deposits 
only. For a more detailed description of the DDOS data and a reconciliation with 
the FOF data, see "Survey  of Demand Deposit Ownership,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin, 
vol. 57 (June 1971), pp. 456-67. 
38. The monthly data have recently been used in an interesting  paper by Helen 
T. Farr, Richard D. Porter, and Eleanor M. Pruitt, "The Demand Deposit Owner- 
ship Survey" (Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, n.d.; processed). 
Besides making a strong case for the virtues of a sectoral disaggregation  of money 
demand, the paper provides a good introduction  to the DDOS data. 
39. The business  data are defined here (and in my earlier paper) to include mail 
float. This is a slight overstatement  but unfortunately  there are no data for a reliable 
sectoral breakdown  of mail float. Stephen M. Goldfeld  709 
Table 9.  Money Holdings by Sector, End of Year, 1952, 1972, and 1975 
Billions of dollars 
1972 
before 
Sector  1952  1972  1975  revisions 
Businessa  52.9  91.5  98.9  72.3 
Household  62.4  141.4  170.1  156.5 
State and local government  7.2  15.1  14.3  14.6 
Financial  6.7  14.9  16.9  17.0 
Rest of the world  2.0  8.1  14.0  7.8 
Allsectors  131.2  271.0  314.2  268.3 
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Flow of Funds Accounts, 1945-1972" 
(FRB,  1973; processed); "Flow of Funds Accounts, 2nd Quarter 1976; Revised Data, 1966-1975" (FRB, 
1976; processed). Figures are rounded. 
a.  Includes mail float. 
In principle,  money  holdings  for each sector  should  be analyzed  in the 
context of a full treatment  of its assets and liabilities.  To keep things 
manageable,  however,  I shall  take a somewhat  more empirical  approach, 
relying  on the same general  form of specification  used above.40 
BUSINESS  SECTOR 
For the nonfinancial  business sector, which currently  holds roughly 
30 percent  of the narrowly  defined  money stock, at least four measures 
of transactions  are  readily  available:  GNP, gross  business  product,  manu- 
facturing  and trade  sales, and debits.  Equations  using  each of these  mea- 
sures  in conjunction  with the commercial  paper rate, the previous  peak 
commercial  paper rate, and a lagged dependent  variable  are shown in 
table 10.41 All these equations  seem reasonably  successful,  and they are 
compared  further  in the first  four columns  of table 11. That  table  reports 
the RMSEs for longer-term  simulations  (ending in 1973:4)  based on 
40.  I used both available forms of the basic data-the  seasonally adjusted  flows 
and the unadjusted  end-of-quarter  levels. The flows were used by cumulating them 
into stocks, with the initial stock calculated by assuming that the average adjusted 
and unadjusted stocks were equal for the year 1952. The unadjusted stocks were 
used directly along with seasonal dummy variables.  The two methods, in fact, gave 
closely similar parameter  estimates so, with the exception of some summary  simula- 
tions, only the seasonally adjusted  results will be reported. 
41. All  use the nominal-adjustment  specification. The GNP deflator is used in 
equation 10.1 while the business-product  deflator is used in the remaining three 
equations. S  S 
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table 10 specifications  estimated  through  various parts of the sample 
along with simulations  from some variants  of equation  10.4. In compari- 
sons of the first four columns, the equations  using GNP  or business 
product  (10.3 and 10.4) dominate  the sales  or debits  specifications  (10.1 
and 10.2). The choice between  GNP and  business  product  is a toss-up.42 
All the equations  characterized  in the first  four columns  make use of 
the peak commercial  paper rate in logarithmic  form, a variable  whose 
status was left in question  in the aggregate  results  above. However, as 
columns  5 and 6 of table 11 show, the logarithmic  peak rate dominates 
a specification  that excludes  this variable  or a specification  in which  it is 
entered  linearly.43 
While equations 10.3 and 10.4 seem reasonable  over the pre-1974 
period,  a number  of other  variables  were tried  to see whether  they could 
be improved  upon.  Among  these  were  previous  peak GNP, the marginal- 
debits variables  used earlier,  and various output-composition  variables 
including  inventories.  None of these  improved  on the  record  of the simpler 
equations. 
Business Loans.  One explanation  often advanced  for business  money 
holdings  is the need to hold compensating  balances  against  loans, lines 
of credit,  or other  services."  Thus  a shift  in business  financing  away  from 
loan demand,  or even an expectation  of such a shift on the part of busi- 
nesses, could cause a decline  in business  holdings  of deposits.  One crude 
way to allow for this factor  is to include  the volume  of commercial  loans 
in equation  10.4.45 The resulting  coefficients  on both GNP and loans are 
positive  but insignificant.  Commercial  loans and any of the transactions 
variables  are so highly  correlated  that it is impossible  to disentangle  their 
separate  effects.46  Adopting  the bizarre  tack of using a commercial-loan 
42.  To keep the results with different  deflators  comparable,  all RMSEs have been 
expressed in terms of the overall implicit deflator. 
43.  It might also be noted that, in logarithmic form, the coefficient of the peak 
rate appears  quite stable for different  sample periods. 
44.  Indeed, at least one writer has argued that this is essentially the only reason 
that firms hold demand deposits. See Case M. Sprenkle,  Eflects of Large Firm and 
Bank Behavior on the Demand for Money of Large Firms (American Bankers  Asso- 
ciation, 1971). 
45.  This method is crude for a variety of reasons: compensating-balance  require- 
ments may vary cyclically; balances may compensate banks for other services; and 
firms would hold some of these balances in any event. 
46.  The correlation between GNP and the stock of commercial loans over the 
period 1952-73 is 0.995. Attempts at getting around this by constraining  the income 
elasticity and estimating a loan coefficient revealed a total inability to discriminate 
among the various point estimates on the basis of the sum of squared  residuals. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  713 
variable  instead of a measure  of transactions  yields an equally  acceptable 
equation,  as shown  by the simulation  results  in column  8 of table 11. 
My  inability  to identify  a separate  effect  for  the  commercial-loan  variable 
is unfortunate  in view of the recent  behavior  of commercial  loans.  Indeed, 
as has been noted elsewhere,  one of the unique  features  of the present 
period  is the failure  of business  loans to grow,  as they typically  do during 
recoveries.47  Such  loans have, rather,  declined,  with the drop  particularly 
noticeable  at large  banks.  In part,  this reflects  the strong  growth  of funds 
internally  generated  by firms,  the extended  period  over which  inventories 
have been reduced  or increased  only moderately,  and a shift to longer- 
term  financing  by firms.48  The inability  to get a separate  explanatory  role 
for loans in the equations  means  an inability  to capture  the possible  im- 
portance  of these  effects  in the  recent  period.49 
Post-1973  Results.  The performance  of the business  equations  in the 
most  recent  quarters  is summarized  in the last  two  rows  of table 11. There, 
the error characteristics  in the post-1973 quarters  show that the per- 
formance  of the  business  equation  prior  to 1974 breaks  down  dramatically 
for all the specifications  in the most recent  ten quarters.  The results in 
column  4, for example,  imply  an RMSE  of about  7 percent  and a 1976:2 
error  of about 13 percent.  As in the aggregate  equations,  the bulk of the 
error  in the last ten quarters  stems  from  the performance  of the equations 
over the last four quarters.50  While it is certainly  possible  that business- 
loan and business-financing  variables  partially  solve the puzzle, this  judg- 
ment  is at best speculative.5 
HOUSEHOLD  SECTOR 
Several  equations  for the  household  sector  using  alternative  transactions 
variables  are given in table 12. All the equations seem to "work,"  al- 
47.  For a discussion, see Alton Gilbert, "Bank  Financing of the Recovery,"  Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 58 (July 1976), pp. 2-9. 
48.  For details, see ibid. I also tried variables relating to internal funds, gross 
investment, and funds raised in credit markets, but these never attained statistical 
significance  over the pre-1973 period. 
49.  However, it should be noted that Farr and others, "Demand Deposit Owner- 
ship Survey,"  who were able to get a loan variable in their monthly equation, still 
had considerable  difficulty  with the most recent period. 
50. This can be seen in table 15 below, which reports  the RMSEs for four-quarter 
intervals. 
51. In this regard,  it is somewhat curious that the specification  that uses commer- 
cial loans as a transactions  variable (column 8) does better than most of those with 
a conventional transactions  variable. Cd 
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Table 13. Errors for Simulations  for the Household Sector, 
1966:2-1973:4 Endpointsa 





Estimation  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation  seasonally 
endpoint  form  form  form  form  unadjusted 
(year and quarter)  12.1  12.2  12.3  12.4  data 
Root-mean-square  error  to 1973:4  from estimation  endpoint 
1966:2  13.7  11.4  10.2  8.0  9.9 
1967:2  11.3  8.2  7.6  4.8  7.4 
1968:2  6.6  2.8  3.2  2.3  4.8 
1969:2  4.1  2.3  2.4  2.6  3.5 
1970:2  4.1  2.3  3.0  2.4  3.2 
Root-mean-square  error  to 1976:2  from 1973:4 
1973:4  4.0  5.7  4.8  4.4  3.7 
Error  in 1976:2 
1973:4  -6.2  -10.1  -8.0  -8.8  -4.8 
Sources: Derived from equations in table 12. 
a.  The equations were estimated from  1952:3 to the endpoint and extrapolated to 1973:4, except for 
the 1973:4 endpoint, for which the extrapolation is to 1976:2. 
though  it should  be noted  that  the Treasury  bill rate  is omitted  from  these 
equations  because it was never significant.  Among other variables  that 
proved equally inconsequential  are the two ratchet variables,  various 
output-composition  measures,  and the level of net worth.  A change  in the 
wealth variable,  however,  was marginally  significant  and one result  with 
this  variable  is reported  in equation  12.4. 
Table 13 reports  the summary  results  for the longer-term  simulations 
with the household-sector  equations,  paralleling  table 11 for the business 
sector.  Some of the RMSEs  are a bit large  in the earlier  periods,  but they 
settle down after a while. Of the three  transactions  variables,  in the pre- 
1974 period GNP is clearly  the worst, while consumption  and personal 
income  are  equally  good. It is also clear  that  the  change-in-wealth  variable 
substantially  improves  the simulation  performance  prior  to 1974. 
In the most recent  period,  the overestimate  in money  demand  that ap- 
pears  in the aggregate  and business-sector  projections  is readily  apparent 
in the household  sector  as well, although  the percentage  errors  are  smaller 
than those in the business  sector.  For example,  equation 12.4 yields an 716  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
RMSE of 3.4 percent  and an error  in 1976:2 of 6.8 percent.  Other  speci- 
fications,  such as equation  12.1, do somewhat  better  but, as in the  business 
sector,  these are not the equations  one would have bet on using the pre- 
puzzle  results.  Interestingly,  the equation  with seasonally  unadjusted  data 
does the best  in the  recent-period  projections. 
REMAINING  SECTORS 
One estimated  equation  for each of the remaining  three  sectors  is given 
in table 14. Money  holdings  of the financial  sector,  which  is something  of 
a hybrid,  are taken to depend  on savings  deposits (as a scale variable) 
and the Treasury  bill rate.52  In the state and local government  sector 
money holdings were taken to depend on state and local government 
spending  as a transactions  variable  and on the current  and  previous  peak 
values of the commercial  paper  rate. Money holdings  of the rest of the 
world  were  taken  simply  as a function  of GNP. 
Quite  evidently,  all these  equations  are  extremely  ad hoc, although  they 
do fit the data reasonably  well. Furthermore,  as the last two columns  in 
table 14 indicate, they extrapolate  in satisfactory  fashion in the post- 
1973 period.  Evidence  on the performance  of these equations  in earlier 
periods  is contained  in table 15. However,  since  the main  reason  for esti- 
mating  these equations  is merely  to "close the system"  so as to be able 
to predict  M1  by aggregating  the various  components,  these specifications 
will  not be scrutinized  further. 
ADDING  UP 
There  are two primary  reasons  for carrying  out the present  exercise  in 
disaggregation.  The first, based on the premise  that sectors  behave dif- 
ferently,  is to move away  from the implicit  specification  error  committed 
in an aggregate  equation.  In this  regard,  sectoral  differences  clearly  emerge 
in the previously  reported  results.  For example,  different  sets of explana- 
tory  variables  were  important  for the household  and  the business  sectors. 
Furthermore,  the long-run income and interest elasticities  differed  in 
the two sectors.  For households,  the income and interest  elasticities  are 
52. The financial sector is considerably  more extensive than the thrift institutions 
so that a broader-scale  variable is undoubtedly  appropriate.  I tried a proxy for finan- 
cial debits, but it was not significant. 6 
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about 1.0 and 0.35, respectively,  while the corresponding  numbers  for 
the business  sector are about  0.5 and 0.25. These  interest  elasticities  fur- 
ther suggest that the overall interest  elasticities  may be understated  if 
computed  from  a single  aggregate  equation. 
The second reason  for disaggregation  was the notion  that tailoring  the 
specifications  to fit the individual  sectors  might  yield an implied  aggregate 
equation  that  was more  useful  for extrapolation  than  a directly  estimated 
aggregate  one. In the background  was the hope that such disaggregation 
might  reduce  the puzzle.  Failing  that, of course,  disaggregation  would  at 
least point to the sectors  in which  the problem  really  lies. Table 15 sheds 
light  on some  of these  issues. 
The table  contains  the RMSEs  for four-quarter  out-of-sample  extrapo- 
lations  for the various  equations,  for the sum of these equations,  and for 
a single aggregate  equation.  The latter uses the specification  of 5.1.51 
Comparing  the last two columns  of table 15 suggests  that  up to mid-1974 
the disaggregated  equations,  on the whole, do better  than the aggregate 
one in tracking  M1. This provides  some small support  for the virtues  of 
disaggregation. 
For the most recent  period,  the results  from  both the aggregate  equation 
and  the sum  of the component  equations  are  rather  poor. This conclusion 
is reinforced  by the quarterly  simulation  errors (listed below in billions 
of 1972 dollars) for the aggregate  equation  and  the sum  of the component 
equations,  based on estimation  through  the end of 1973, one of the last 
obviously  "safe"  quarters. 
1974  1975  1976 
1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2 
Aggregate  -2.8  -1.9  -6.4  -5.3  -13.4  -6.3  -9.5  -14.3  -18.1  -21.6 
Sum of 
components  -1.5  0.3  -2.5  -0.4  -  8.9  -2.7  -6.5  -11.2  -15.2  -18.7 
These  results  suggest  that 1974 was not much  of a problem,  that 1975:1 
perhaps  marks the beginning  of the trouble, and that the shortfall  in 
money demand  has really mushroomed  in the last three  quarters. 
The residual  in 1976:2 of $18.7 billion (in 1972 prices) can be at- 
tributed  entirely  to the business  and household  sectors;  the other three 
sectors  net out to a zero error.  Of this $18.7 billion, businesses  account 
53. While other forms of the aggregate  equation could have been used, as table 7 
shows, equation 5.1 is probably the best choice for the pre-1974 period. The aggre- 
gate equation is based on  the FOF definition of  Ml  which is  an end-of-quarter 
estimate, so the errors shown in table 15 differ slightly from those in table 7. "4  "4  1.4  ~~~6  cli  -4  O 
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for $9.8 billion while households  account  for $8.8 billion. The results 
using seasonally  unadjusted  data suggest  that even more of the difficulty 
lies with the business  sector.54  By judicious  choice  of other  specifications, 
one could have reduced  the error  in the last quarter  by at least $5 billion 
and perhaps  as much as $8 billion or $9 billion, but this is obviously 
silly.55  The point of this exercise  is not to exhibit  the best-fitting  equation 
over the most recent  quarters,  but to see how the best equations,  judged 
by historical  standards,  would fit the recent period. On this criterion, 
recent  behavior,  whether  looked at in an aggregate  or disaggregated  con- 
text, is clearly  outside the range  of historical  experience.  The bulk of the 
error  appears  to stem from the performance  of the business equation  in 
the last few quarters,  although  the household  equation  is not without  its 
difficulties. 
Overview 
By this juncture  it should  be apparent  that a large unexplained  error 
remains  in the money-demand  function. Further  insight  into this phe- 
nomenon may come from a brief exploration  of potentially  important 
factors  omitted  from the specifications  above, especially  institutional  de- 
velopments  that may have lowered  transactions  costs and thus reduced 
the demand  for money.  Among the most notable  of these are negotiable 
orders of withdrawal  (NOW)  accounts, money-market  mutual funds, 
savings  deposits  of businesses  and state and local governments,  checking 
accounts  at mutual  savings  banks, automatic  investment  accounts,  tele- 
phone transfers  between savings and checking  accounts, and overdraft 
privileges.  Because it was unclear  how to "model"  these developments, 
I did not modify  the specification  for them.  Nevertheless,  it is possible  to 
say a bit more  in this  context. 
Data are  available  to reflect  use of some  of these  innovations,  and, more 
important,  to imply that at least some part of this use has come at the 
expense of demand deposits. NOW accounts, for example,  rose from 
about  $200 million  in mid-1974  to about  $1.6 billion  in 1976:3, with  the 
54. The corresponding  error in 1976:2 is $14.8 billion, of which $10.1 billion is 
due to the business sector and only $4.8 billion to the household sector. 
55.  For example, if one used equation 10.4 with a linear peak rate and equation 
12.1, the error in 1976:2 would be reduced  by $5 billion. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  721 
bulk of the growth  in the last year.  Similarly,  checking  accounts  at mutual 
savings  banks have increased  from $200 million  in 1975:3 to $400 mil- 
lion in 1976:3. The most marked  expansion  has taken place in savings 
deposits  of state  and local governments  and  businesses.  The former  grew 
from about $500 million in 1975:3 to over $3 billion in 1976:3, while 
the latter, first authorized  in November 1975, now stand at over $61/2 
billion.  How much  of the increase  in all these categories  has been at the 
expense  of demand  deposits  is not easy to establish,  but some crude  evi- 
dence suggests  that about  $4 billion would not be a bad guess.56 
In the spirit  of identifying  factors  omitted  from  the equations,  it is also 
appropriate  to make an adjustment  for compensating-balance  require- 
ments.  Commercial  loans at large  banks  fell by about  $10 billion  between 
July 1975 and July 1976, suggesting  that about  $1 billion  to $11/2  billion 
of the shortfall  in demand  deposits  might  be accounted  for by this source. 
Furthermore,  some survey  evidence  suggests  that compensating-balance 
requirements  have eased  in the recent  period  so that the total effect  from 
this source  could be substantially  higher. 
Adding up all the bits and pieces gives something  on the order of $5 
billion to $6 billion as a plausible  estimate  of a money-demand  shortfall 
that could be readily associated  with the factors just described. This 
accounts  for roughly  20 percent of the error  in the basic equation  5.1 
but what is left is still too large  to be explained  by chance. 
Part of the explanation  of the remaining  error  undoubtedly  lies in the 
impact  of institutional  developments  that operate  in more subtle  ways- 
telephone  transfers,  overdrafts,  and automatic-investment  accounts.  Here 
the primary  effect  on transactions  costs stems  from  the mere  existence  of 
the institution,  and data on actual  use (even if it were available) is, at 
best, indirectly  relevant.  For example, the availability  of an overdraft 
privilege,  which removes the problem of check bouncing, might lead 
individuals  to cut back on demand  deposits.  Furthermore,  this cutback 
could well be distributed  across  a broad  range  of assets so that it might 
be difficult  to isolate. A similar  problem  is created  by the automatic-in- 
vestment  account,  under  which,  at the end of a working  day, a bank  will 
invest a firm's  "excess"  balances,  often by borrowing  the funds from its 
customer.  The bank  thus avoids  reserve  requirements  and,  in effect,  pays 
56. For  more  details, see  J.  Paulus and S.  H.  Axilrod,  "Recent Regulatory 
Changes and Financial Innovations Affecting the Growth of the Monetary Aggre- 
gates" (Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, 1976; processed). 722  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
interest  on demand  deposits.  However,  since a firm  could have invested 
on its own, the main  consequence  is the reduction  of the effective  broker- 
age charge,  whose  result  is difficult  to assess.57 
This discussion  highlights  the pressing  research  need to come to grips 
with the way in which  these  institutional  developments  impinge  on trans- 
actions costs and thus on money demand.  Indeed, these developments 
are likely to become more widespread  and numerous  (for example,  cur- 
rently  pending  is authorization  to permit  transfers  from saving  accounts 
to cover demand-deposit  overdrafts).  Their impact on the demand  for 
M1 is thus likely to grow, raising  the specter  that future  residuals  in a 
conventional  M1  equation  will dwarf  the present  ones. 
TIME  DEPOSITS  AND  M2 
The shortfall  in M, demand  must,  of necessity,  find its "mirror  image" 
somewhere  else in the balance sheet. In a limited attempt  to find this 
image, I briefly  explored  the behavior  of time deposits. That this is a 
plausible  place to look is suggested  both by the substantial  growth in 
savings  deposits  of businesses  and state  and  local governments  just noted, 
and  by the fact that  M2  seems  to be coming  in at the high  end of the Fed's 
target-growth  range  while  M1  is at the  low end  of its range. 
The first  row of table 16 reports  the results  of estimating  a per capita 
nominal-adjustment  version (that is, an equation  like 5.1)  for time de- 
posits over the period 1952:2-1973:4.  The resulting  parameter  esti- 
mates are plausible;  and, as the table indicates,  when dynamically  simu- 
lated, the equation  understates  the actual  level in 1976:2 by $8 billion 
in 1972 prices. Taken at face value, this suggests  that a significant  part 
of the error  in M1 has shown  up in time deposits. While  this conclusion 
is in keeping  with the arithmetic  exercise,  unfortunately  it turns  out to be 
a bit facile. As shown  in table 17, which summarizes  simulations  based 
57. A related way in which cash-management  techniques  may reduce the demand 
for money is by improving  the synchronization  between payments and receipts. Ex- 
amples of this include arrangements  for offsetting interbusiness  payments without 
cash transactions (something banks do in a very large way through various types of 
clearing arrangements);  use of drafts, rather  than checks, which transfer funds only 
as needed; and use of lockbox facilities to speed up the collection process. Unfortu- 
nately, it is not clear how to quantify these developments. For a more formal ap- 
proach to the problem,  see, for example, Merton H. Miller and Daniel Orr,  "A Model 
of  the Demand for Money by Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.  80 
(August 1966), pp. 413-35. a'0 
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Table  17. Errors  for Longer-Term  Simulations  for Time  Deposits  and  M2, 
1966:2-1970:2  Endpointsa 
Billions of 1972 dollars 
Root-mean-square  error  to 
Estimation  1973:4  from estimated  endpoint  Error  for 1973:4 
endpoint 
(year and  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation 
quarter)  16.1  16.2  16.3  16.1  16.2  16.3 
1966:2  19.7  16.7  15.0  33.5  20.5  22.9 
1967:2  7.3  11.1  4.8  12.5  10.9  -5.6 
1968:2  4.8  5.2  4.4  7.5  -6.0  -4.1 
1969:2  4.1  6.2  4.4  4.3  -7.6  -4.1 
1970:2  8.6  7.4  7.0  10.7  2.4  6.2 
Sources:  Based on table 16 and text equation 16.3. 
a.  The equations were estimated from 1952:3 to the endpoint and extrapolated to 1973:4. 
on pre-1974 data, equation  16.1 has had a clear tendency  to understate 
time deposits in out-of-sample  extrapolations  in all previous periods. 
Furthermore,  when  I compared  equation  16.1 with a specification  based 
on the real-adjustment  model, it was evident  that the latter  had smaller 
simulation  errors  in earlier  periods.  This  equation  also  produced  a 1976:2 
error  of only $11/2  billion,  hardly  much  of an offset  to the error  in M1,  and 
the simulation  results  shown  in table 17 for equation  16.3 were  also some- 
what better than those for 16.1. 58 
The estimated  equation  over 1952:2-1973:4 was 
(16.3)  ln (TD/P)  -0.92  +O.234  ln y +  0.054  In RTD 
(2.3)  (2.5)  (5.0) 
-  0.038  In RTB +  0. 867 ln (TD/P)_1. 
(6.7)  (18.1) 
While I would not defend the real-adjustment  specification  on a priori 
grounds,  this at least indicates  that equation  16.1 does not give the de- 
finitive  answer  on the subject.  Attempts  to improve  this equation  by in- 
cluding  competing  rates  for the thrift  institutions  (on both passbooks  and 
certificates)  and  net worth  met  with  little  success. 
A final  attempt  I made  in this vein was to look at M2.  The same  specifi- 
cation as in equation  16.1 yielded an unsatisfactory  equation  in that the 
58. Virtually all of  the difference between the $8 billion and the $11/2 billion 
figures stems from the use of Pt rather than Pt-,,  and not from deflation  by popula- 
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coefficient  of the time deposit  rate was essentially  zero.59  However,  add- 
ing the average  passbook  rate at savings  and  loan associations  and  mutual 
savings  banks appears  to fix the matter,  as shown in equation 16.2 in 
table 16. All the  variables  in 16.2 are  appropriately  signed  and  statistically 
significant  and the equation  has an RMSE over the last ten quarters  of 
0.6 percent  and  an error  in 1976:2 of only 0.8 percent.  Somewhat  skepti- 
cal in view of my earlier  experience,  I next split the full sample  period 
from 1952:2 to 1976:2 in half and the equation  passed a stability  test. 
Finally, as the appropriate  columns  of table 17 indicate,  at least since 
1968 this equation  performs  reasonably  well in longer-term  simulations 
with no particular  tendency  to overpredict  or underpredict.  From this 
limited  evidence,  at least, no particular  shift is apparent  in the M2  equa- 
tion. 
However,  for several  reasons,  I think  it would  be a mistake  to interpret 
this finding  as clearing  up the mystery  in M1. First, there remains  the 
inconsistency  between  the equations  for time deposits  and for M2, with 
the thrift  rate important  only in the latter.  Second,  since all of the short- 
fall in M1  can hardly  be expected  to show  up in time  deposits  (M2 -MJ, 
there is  a sense in which the M2 equation  "overexplains"  the shortfall. 
Finally,  the specification  I have used for M2  has not been scrutinized  all 
that carefully  in comparison  with alternative  specifications.  Nevertheless, 
some may be tempted  to draw some policy morals from the apparent 
stability  of M2,  and this issue  is touched  on in the final  section. 
Implications  and Conclusions 
The results of  this paper are difficult  to characterize.  Insofar as the 
objective  was an improved  specification  of the demand  function  for M1, 
capable  of explaining  the current  shortfall  in money demand,  the paper 
is rather  a failure.  Specifications  that seem most reasonable  on the basis 
of earlier  data  are not the ones that  make  a substantial  dent  in explaining 
the recent  data.  The paper  has served  to pinpoint  the business  sector  as a 
prime  source  of the current  puzzle,  but this hardly  constitutes  an explana- 
tion.  Of course,  negative  results  of the sort  I have  presented  never  "prove" 
59.  One of the things that has always bothered me about an M2 equation is that 
the time deposit rate does double duty, serving both as an own rate for the time 
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anything.  There  is always  the possibility  that  someone  with  more  ingenuity 
will be able  to repackage  the data  so as to make  one homogeneous  period 
out of 1952 to 1976, but my fatigue  at least entitles  me to some skepti- 
cism. Perhaps  the most promising  tack is to cope with the problem  of 
transaction  costs. 
For the present,  while one can quibble  about formal definitions  of a 
"shift"  in a behavioral  function,  it seems  plausible  to presume  that, at a 
practical  level, some sort of shift has occurred.  This presumption,  of 
course, is a result  in itself and the question  then becomes  what lessons 
to draw  from  it. 
The first obvious task is to ascertain  both the current  position of the 
function  and whether  it has in some sense settled  down. One possibility 
is that the shift is temporary  and that the previous  relationship  will be 
reestablished  so that  M1  will return  to its predicted  level. For a variety  of 
reasons, some relating  to the kinds of ratchet  effects found above and 
others stemming  from a potential  diminution  of  the importance  of M1 
as a transactions  medium,  I regard  this possibility  as unlikely  over the 
long run. However,  should there be a tendency  in this direction  in the 
near term-for  example,  if loan demand  induces  a rebound  in business 
money  balances-it  would  have rather  strong  implications  for the proper 
course  of monetary  policy. 
A  second possibility  is that the level of money demand  has gradually 
shifted,  and the old function  will still predict  marginal  changes  well from 
here on. This view is suggested  by a crude  examination  of the data on 
velocity,  which,  after  a rapid  rise from 1975:2 to 1976:1, has slowed  in 
the last few quarters  to a more normal  pace. If this "marginal"  view is 
correct,  better  forecasts  for the most recent quarters  might be obtained 
by excluding  the post-1973 data  from  the sample  period  because  they are 
likely to contaminate  the parameter  estimates.  Indeed,  a test of this pro- 
cedure  could  be interpreted  as an indirect  test of the marginal  view. Thus, 
I ran a dynamic  simulation,  starting  in  1976:1, of equation  5.1, which 
was estimated  through  the end of 1973. It produced  an error  in 1976:3 
of $9.8 billion (in 1972 prices). The corresponding  error  with the same 
equation  estimated  through  1975:4 was only $3.4 billion, but the equa- 
tion displayed  some strange  parameter  estimates. This outcome  hardly 
provides  support  for the marginal  view,  at  least  as yet. 
A final  possibility  is that  explaining  M1  calls  for a new  function  in terms 
of level and  marginal  responses  and  perhaps  in terms  of variables  as well. Stephen M. Gold/eld  727 
While I am inclined  to this view, since most of the large errors  in the 
existing equations  have come in the last few quarters,  there is hardly 
enough  evidence  to identify  a new money-demand  function  with existing 
data.60  Although waiting  for more observations  may be the inevitable 
research  strategy,  unfortunately  it will not do when it comes  to monetary 
policy. For, even admitting  to confusion  over the current  state  of money 
demand  in itself should  have implications  for monetary  policy. I hasten 
to note that a number  of economists  would  quarrel  with  this view. 
A  "ST.  LOUIS  EQUATION" 
Many economists  of the monetarist  persuasion  would  not see much  in 
the present  paper  to disturb  their conventional  policy prescription.  Curi- 
ously  enough,  many  monetarists  do not seem  much  concerned  with  money- 
demand  functions.  The reason  may  be that  they  think  of them as interest- 
rate equations  normalized  on the wrong  variable,  or else as misspecified 
"St. Louis equations,"61  also normalized  on the wrong  variable.  Indeed, 
this group mainly  fears that the apparent  instability  of money demand 
will lead to a greater  emphasis  on interest  rates at the expense of the 
monetary  aggregates  in the conduct  of policy.62  I have heard some argu- 
ments  to buttress  the case against  such a shift in emphasis  that might  be 
paraphrased  thus: "The  St. Louis equation  is alive and well and therefore 
business  can proceed  as usual."  Despite  my basic reservations  about  this 
approach,  I was curious  about  the factual  validity  of the matter  and  hence 
reestimated  several  versions  of the St.  Louis  equation. 
Following the distributed-lag  specification  of Andersen  and Carlson, 
I related  the change  in nominal  GNP to current  and  past changes  of both 
60. Another possible approach is one that explicitly allows for evolution over 
time of the estimated parameters.  For an example, see Donald J. Mullineaux, "The 
Stability of  the Demand for Money: Some Adaptive Regression Tests" (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,  n.d.; processed). 
61. See Leonall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carlson, "A Monetarist Model for 
Economic Stabilization,"  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 52 (April 
1970), pp. 7-25. 
62. At least one economist, implicitly accepting  the instability  of money demand, 
has blamed the whole thing on the introduction  of flexible exchange rates and, turn- 
ing things around, has used the instability as an argument for restoring fixed ex- 
change rates. See Eugene A. Birnbaum,  "Doubts  About Floating Rates," Wall Street 
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the full-employment  surplus  and a money-stock  measure.  For the latter, 
I used both M1 and M2 and estimated  each equation  over two different 
sample periods,  1953:1-1972:4  and 1953:1-1973:4.  These equations 
were  then extrapolated  in the out-of-sample  quarters  up to 1976:2. 
The equation  using M1 estimated  over the shorter  sample  period  was 
off in the level of nominal  GNP by $42 billion by 1974:3, but got back 
on track  by 1975:2 with an error  of only $17 billion. However,  over  the 
following  four quarters,  this equation  understated  the rise in GNP by a 
whopping  $107 billion and  thus  ended  up in 1976:2 understating  the  level 
of GNP by $124 billion. The equation  estimated  through  1973:4 gave 
only slightly  better  results,  with the understatement  of the change  in the 
last four quarters  amounting  to $101 billion and an error  in the level in 
1976:2 of $75 billion. For the equations  using M2, the understatement 
of the change  was somewhat  smaller-either $77 billion or $71 billion, 
depending  on which estimates  were used. In broad outline,  these results 
are quite consistent  with the difficulties  experienced  with money-demand 
functions.  Consequently,  at least by my reading  of the evidence,  the St. 
Louis equation  seems to be in no better  shape than the money-demand 
function, and policy prescriptions  based on the presumption  of a stable 
St. Louis  equation  certainly  need  to be reexamined. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  MONETARY  POLICY 
One of  the ongoing debates in the conduct of monetary  policy is 
whether  interest  rates  or monetary  aggregates  should  be used to steer the 
economy.  A subsidiary  issue in the debates,  at least up to this juncture, 
has been the choice of a particular  monetary  aggregate.  To make clear 
the principles,  first consider a world with a single monetary  asset. For 
such a world, Poole has shown that it is the relative  importance  of dis- 
turbances  in the monetary  sector  vis-a-vis  the real sector  that determines 
whether  interest  rates or monetary  aggregates  merit  greater  emphasis  in 
the conduct of policy.63  Poole's results suggest  that an increase  in the 
importance  of monetary  disturbances  should tilt policy in the direction 
of an interest-rate  policy. In conjunction  with this principle,  the results 
63. William Poole, "Optimal  Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments  in a Simple 
Stochastic Macro Model," Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol.  84  (May 1970), 
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in this paper  clearly  argue  in favor of an interest-rate  policy over an Ml 
policy  at the  present  time.64 
In a realistic  policy setting  the situation  is complicated  by the existence 
of numerous  monetary  aggregates.  In this context,  based on the relative 
stability  of the M2 equation,  one can argue  that the monetary  authority 
should  pay more attention  to M2.  It is thus hardly  surprising  to find  that 
the Fed has hedged its bets by downplaying  its emphasis  on M1 at the 
same time that it is placing  more weight  on both interest  rates and M2.65 
While,  given  a casual  application  of Poole's  results,  this  response  seems 
plausible,  there  remain  some unanswered  questions.  First,  what  will con- 
trolling  M2  achieve?  Appeal  by analogy  to Poole's  results  does not neces- 
sarily  make  this  policy the proper  response  even if M2  is more  stable  than 
M1. Resolving  this issue requires  a fleshed-out  economic  model which, 
among other things,  would presumably  allow one to address  the virtues 
of controlling  various  monetary  aggregates  (such  as M3) as well as  interest 
rates.  A second  issue is the controllability  of the various  aggregates.  And 
a third  concerns  the relative  weights  to be attached  to various  aggregates 
and interest  rates. Given  my lingering  suspicions  of the robustness  of the 
M2 equation,  I suspect that the Fed's relative  weights  between  interest 
rates  and  M2  are  skewed  more  toward  M2  than  I would  like. I also suspect 
they  are  still  giving  M1  more  weight  than  it deserves. 
Apart from the issue of the variables  to be controlled,  there remains 
the fundamental  question  of what degree of monetary  stimulus  is con- 
sistent  with a healthy  economic  recovery  over the near  term.  Even within 
the limited scope of the present  paper, there is one exercise  that might 
shed some light on this question.  I took forecasts  of real GNP, the GNP 
deflator,  and the Treasury  bill rate from the Michigan  quarterly  model66 
64. The application of the Poole framework to the present circumstances  is an 
oversimplification. That  framework takes the  parameters of  the  underlying be- 
havioral functions as given and focuses on the additive uncertainty  stemming from 
the disturbance  terms. As indicated above, substantial  doubt exists as to the values 
of these parameters in the Ml equation and this form of uncertainty must be ac- 
counted for. See William Brainard, "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness of Policy," 
American  Economic Review, vol. 57 (May 1967), pp. 411-25. 
65.  "The FOMC has taken account of this by giving somewhat greater  emphasis 
to M2  or money market conditions  and by widening  the two-months  ranges  especially 
that for M1."  Henry Wallich, "Some Technical Aspects of Monetary Policy" (paper 
delivered  to the Institutional  Investor Institute, May 1976; processed), p. 9. 
66. The Michigan forecast assumes a $13 billion tax cut and leads in 1977 to a 
year-over-year  increase in real GNP and the deflator  of 4.3 percent and 5.6 percent, 730  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
and used them  as inputs  to extrapolate  the M2  equation  of table  16.6? The 
M2  growth  implied  by this exercise  is 12.8 percent  from  the third  quarter 
of 1976 to the third quarter  of 1977, with not much quarter-to-quarter 
variability.  For what  it is worth,  this growth  rate is well above the 101/2 
percent  that is the upper end of the Fed's target range for M2 for the 
corresponding  period,  suggesting  that  something-perhaps  even  the equa- 
tion-has  to give somewhere. 
respectively. The forecast Treasury bill rate rises from just under 4.9 percent in 
1976:4 to 5.9 percent in 1977:4. See Saul H. Hymans and Harold T. Shapiro, "The 
U.S. Economic Outlook for 1977" (University of Michigan, November 1976; pro- 
cessed). 
67. For this purpose I assumed that the two interest rates on savings would re- 
main at their current  levels. Comments 
and  Discussion 
David I. Fand: Goldfeld  has given us a thorough  analysis  of the demand 
for money;  but in spite of the care  he has taken,  he is unable  to track  the 
recent experience  with equations  that also fit the past. He reluctantly 
concludes  that there  has been a shift in the money-demand  function  and 
finds  that  the shift  has been most prominent  in the money  holdings  of the 
business  sector.  A reduction  of perhaps  2 points  in the growth  rate  of M, 
in the past year can be associated  with recent  changes  affecting  NOW ac- 
counts, business anid  state and local government  savings  accounts,  and 
demand  deposits  at mutual  savings  banks. Some reduction  in the recent 
M] growth  rate  may  be due to measurement  error.  But, even after  making 
these allowances,  a sizable  shortfall  in money demand  still remains  unex- 
plained  and poses a particular  problem  for monetarists.  By comparison 
with this large mystery  in M, behavior,  M2 is explained  reasonably  well 
by historical  relationships. 
Goldfeld pays special attention  to how prices should enter into the 
money-demand  equation.  In addition  to comparing  adjustment  specifica- 
tions  in real and  nominal  terms,  he estimates  a model  in which  price-level 
perceptions  matter  to money holdings.  Thus some of the answer  to the 
M] puzzle  may lie with a reduction  in inflationary  expectations  in 1975, 
as a result of which perceived  real-money  balances  may have exceeded 
recorded  real-money  balances.  Some exploratory  results  in this vein are 
presented,  but  they  are  not wholly  successful. 
All in all, we are  still  rather  far  from  understanding  the relation  between 
Ma and recent  economic  developments.  Lacking  any final  answers  to the 
puzzle,  it is instructive  to look at the recent  period  against  the  background 
of different  views expressed  about monetary  policy a year ago. First, 
Arthur  Burns  and the Federal  Reserve  Board  held that a growth  rate of 
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5 to 71/2  percent  in M] was appropriate.  Then a more expansionary  view 
articulated  by Perry  and  Heller  considered  increases  in M, of over 8 per- 
cent to be necessary  to keep  interest  rates  from  rising.  Finally,  a still  more 
expansionary  view, articulated  by Modigliani,  held that M] growth  rates 
of perhaps  10 to 15 percent  might  be needed  in order  to stabilize  short- 
term  rates. 
The actual  experience  in the past  year  has disappointed  all three. 
For a time it seemed that the conservative  view was more nearly  on 
target,  as velocity growth  in the first four quarters  of the recovery  was 
above even what its proponents  were expecting.  But if the conservative 
view was initially  the more  appropriate,  the more  expansionary  views ap- 
pear more appropriate  for the economic  slowdown  in the last three  quar- 
ters of 1976. 
Interest  rates were falling through  most of the seven quarters  of the 
recovery,  rather  than  rising  above  their  levels at the trough  of the recession 
as the conservatives  had  expected  and  as  most  others  would  have  expected, 
especially  if they had known  the course  of M, growth.  Finally,  there  was 
an unexpected  divergence  between  M, and  M2  in recent  quarters  that  needs 
explaining. 
In short, we have all been wrong  on important  questions  at least part 
of the time during  recent  quarters,  and I am inclined  to agree  with Gold- 
feld's view that  we have to take a more  fundamental  look at what  is hap- 
pening  to money  demand. 
William  C. Brainard:  The "Case  of the Missing  Money,"  which  Inspector 
Goldfeld  so painstakingly  investigated,  gives  every  appearance  of remain- 
ing an unsolved  mystery.  Inspectors  Perry  and  Gordon  of the Price  Squad 
must take a certain pleasure in finding that their colleagues working 
the money side of the street are encountering  difficulties  just like those 
that plagued  them in the case of the vagrant  Phillips curve. I'm afraid 
however,  that the citizenry  will be alarmed  by the collapse of law and 
order.  I, for one, was surprised  that so few of the suspects  could be iden- 
tified as being present  at the scene of the crime;  I had rather  supposed 
that the embarrassment  would be the number  of suspects  who could be 
incriminated.  Perhaps  I should  also state  that  I am skeptical  of the ability 
of the demand  for money  to receive  a fair  trial  in any  time-series  court. 
Goldfeld  has given  a careful  summary  of the many  leads  he has tracked Stephen M. Goldfeld  733 
down and the difficulty  of finding  explanations  of the recent  "error"  that 
are compatible  with earlier  experience.  I will confine  most of my remarks 
to general  issues that arise  in the specification  and estimation  of the de- 
mand  for  money. 
Like most investigators,  Goldfeld motivates his specification  of the 
demand  for money  and selection  of variables  by reference  to the Baumol- 
Tobin transactions  model. As Goldfeld  recognizes,  there  is a substantial 
gap between  the variables  indicated  by the theoretical  model and those 
actually  used in empirical  studies.  Much  of his paper  is an attempt  to see 
whether  refining  or changing  the variables  used to represent  the volume 
of transactions,  the opportunity  cost of holding  money,  or the "brokerage 
charge"  for converting  earning  assets into money fix up the equation.  I 
will follow him in organizing  my discussion  by these  three  categories. 
Although  GNP is a standard  transactions  variable,  it is suspect  for a 
number  of reasons.  As Goldfeld  indicates,  GNP  nets  out or ignores  market 
transactions  involving  intermediate  goods, financial  assets, and existing 
goods, as well as transfer  payments.  In attempting  to find out whether 
the historical  correlation  between  the volume of transactions  and GNP 
has been broken  in recent  years,  there  is probably  no substitute  for finding 
direct  measures  of these transactions.  The volume  of sales that Goldfeld 
used in his corporate  demand  function  is one such  variable;  I would  have 
liked  him  to find  similar  measures  for other  items. 
A second difficulty  is posed by the likely significant  differences  in the 
quantity  of money  demanded  per dollar  of different  components  of GNP. 
Some components  have a higher dollar value of transactions  behind a 
reported  dollar contribution  to GNP than others-for  example,  services 
as compared  with  final  sales  of petroleum  products.  Some  components  are 
likely to have a larger  volume  of transactions  per agent  and,  given  econo- 
mies of scale in financial  management,  give rise to a smaller  demand  for 
money. Similarly,  the agents represented  in the various components  of 
GNP may differ  in the number  of transactions  (and hence average  size) 
per dollar  of transactions,  or in the degree  of synchronization  and  uncer- 
tainty  of payments  and receipts.  These are, of course,  the reasons  that a 
given  volume  of transactions  involving  corporations  are expected  to gen- 
erate  a smaller  demand  for money  than  would  be expected  if the transac- 
tions were entirely  among households.  Market  transactions  have agents 
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some  cases, the money balances of  one of the agents may not even be 
counted in the private domestic money  stock-as,  for  example, in the 
case of the government or foreigners. 
The  scarcity of  degrees of freedom obviously precludes entering the 
components  of  GNP  separately (both product and income  sides!)  in a 
single time-series regression. In these circumstances, the idea of using a 
weighted "GNP" series seems sound. Goldfeld tries, with limited success, 
the series of Enzler and his coauthors, which infers the weights by the 
various components' correlation with debits. I believe more could be done 
along these lines, with perhaps greater weight being placed on "a priori" 
information about who is included in money demand and the behavior of 
those who are. 
Goldfeld follows the common practice of running a real-money-demand 
equation, deflating nominal GNP and the money stock by the GNP de- 
flator. In this specification the deflator is serving as both a "transactions" 
price index and a "brokerage  charge" price index. In the real world, prices 
do not move in lockstep, and the GNP deflator seems a poor choice as a 
proxy for either of these. The GNP  deflator is not a transactions price 
index.  Indeed,  an index such as the WPI, which "double counts" as a 
measure of inflation, would be preferable. Also, the deflator does not, in 
principle, pick up the changes in the prices of items, such as imports, that 
are not part of value added. These problems with the deflator may have 
been important in recent years. 
Although it would be harder to show quantitatively, I think that most 
people would agree that the price index for "brokerage  charges"  has prob- 
ably risen less in recent years than the GNP deflator or most goods prices. 
According to the simplest transactions model, the coefficient (in a nomi- 
nal-demand equation)  on  each of  these two  types of prices should be 
one-half; if the above presumptions about relative-price movements are 
correct, it should come as no surprise that an estimated coefficient on the 
GNP deflator is less than one, and such an equation should not be thrown 
out of court on the grounds of "illusion." By running the equation in real 
form, and by excluding a separate price-level term, Goldfeld avoids the 
possibility of estimating "illusion" in the desired demand for money, which 
should perhaps be there. One interpretation of the short-run price illusion 
implied by his preferred adjustment specification is that it is compensating 
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The fact that firms use compensating  balances and hold deposits to 
establish  lines  of credit,  and  the dynamics  of loan "take  down,"  all provide 
rationalizations  for including  loans in the demand-for-money  equations. 
Although  the recent sluggishness  of loan demand  seems to help explain 
the money "error,"  the author  has difficulty  distinguishing  the effects  of 
loans and transaction  variables.  The lag structure  implied  by the partial- 
adjustment  model  he uses is easiest  to rationalize  by a "take  down"  story. 
In principle,  deposits  held to establish  lines of credit  should  lead rather 
than  lag loans and,  in the absence  of a good  proxy  for future  loan demand, 
would  depend  on the prime  rate,  perhaps  in relation  to other  market  rates. 
Although  the interaction  between  loans and the demand  for money  may 
well be important,  and  experimentation  with  these  variations  might  be fun, 
I agree  with Goldfeld  that the time-series  data are unlikely  to sort them 
out satisfactorily. 
Whatever  the difficulties  in distinguishing  among  various  candidates  for 
use as the transactions  or interest-rate  variables  in the demand  for money, 
they are mild compared  with the difficulties  in sorting  out their  lag struc- 
tures. Goldfeld estimates the standard  partial-adjustment  model. This 
builds  in the assumption  that  the lagged  response  of the demand  for  money 
is the same with respect to transactions,  interest  rates, and brokerage 
charges.  This  assumption  seems  highly  implausible  and,  given  the low esti- 
mated  speed  of adjustment,  implies  that  the LM curve  shifts  dramatically 
with each error  in the equation,  or with changes  in the money supply.  I 
doubt  that the demand  equation  would  fit the data  very  well, even for the 
sample  period,  if it were simulated  as part of a fuller  system.  The impli- 
cations of the equation  for the effect of a transitory  change in income 
(say, from a temporary  tax rebate) are, perhaps,  the most at variance 
with  what  I take to be the sense of the transactions  model. In that  model, 
money  balances  serve  as a buffer  stock,  or temporary  abode  of purchasing 
power, and one would expect the transitory  income  to be absorbed  pas- 
sively in money  holdings  in the short  run.  In contrast,  Goldfeld's  partial- 
adjustment  model  states  that  only something  on the order  of 15 percent  of 
the "long-run"  increase  in the demand  for money  will be accommodated 
in the first  quarter.  The lags implied  about  the effect  of interest  rates  are 
more  plausible  but  still  seem  rather  long  to me. 
Although  estimating  separate  lag structures  for  interest  rates  and  income 
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cant coefficients,  it would  be instructive  to learn  what  lag structures  other 
than Goldfeld's  are compatible  with the data. In any case, I don't  really 
mind  a hung  jury. 
General  Discussion 
Several  discussants  noted new or highly  unusual  features  of recent  ex- 
perience  that might  be responsible  for the large  errors  in equations  such 
as Goldfeld's.  Martin  Feldstein  suggested  that  the adoption  of monetary- 
aggregate  targets  by the Federal  Reserve  in the early 1970s could have 
changed the appropriate  statistical-estimation  equation. John Kareken 
reasoned  that  the new exchange-rate  regimes  of recent  years  might  require 
a new specification  of money demand  appropriate  to an open economy 
with relatively  unrestricted  holdings  of foreign  assets.  Walter  Salant  sup- 
ported  this view, noting that the subject  of investigation  was specifically 
the demand  for dollar  money,  which  would  be influenced  both by Ameri- 
cans getting  out of it and foreigners  getting  into it. Goldfeld  agreed  that 
there  might  be something  in this line and reported  that William  Branson 
had found residuals  in foreign equations  that were just the opposite of 
those  for the  U.S. economy. 
James Tobin pointed out that the period of missing money corre- 
sponded  with an unprecedented  decline  in business  bank  loans along  with 
a widening  differential  between  interest  rates on bank loans and money- 
market rates. Although Goldfeld reported  no success with fitting dis- 
tributed  lags on either past or future loans, Tobin still believed that a 
decline in the practice  of holding  compensating  balances  was very likely 
one cause of the recent mystery and that the interest-rate  differential 
might  help explain  it. Kareken  agreed,  noting  that practices  with respect 
to compensating  balances  have been changing  rapidly,  so that they could 
be a source of the recent  M1 shortfall  even if the loan variables  did not 
work  well in historic  equations. 
Robert  J. Gordon  suggested  distinguishing  the effects  of changes  in real 
wealth  from changes  in real income in determining  the marginal  flow of 
savings  into demand  and time deposits.  He noted that real wealth had 
declined  in the mid-1970s, while during  the puzzle period  more money 
than usual had gone into savings  and time deposits  relative  to demand 
deposits.  He reasoned  that this might  reflect  a normal  pattern  of adjust- Stephen  M. Gold/eld  737 
ments  of liquid  assets  when  individuals  were  saving  to rebuild  their  wealth. 
Michael  Wachter  thought  that, instead  of trying  to find new variables 
or specifications  that  give stable  money-demand  equations  over  the period 
as a whole, it would  prove  more  fruitful  to isolate and explain  the struc- 
tural shifts that apparently  had occurred.  The best course for current 
analysis  might  be continually  to reestimate  the equations  and settle for 
short-term  forecasting  from them. Edmund Phelps saw some merit in 
such a strategy,  since recent empirical  analysis  showed  that velocity re- 
sembled  a random  walk once the effects  of interest  rates  were accounted 
for. 
Hendrik  Houthakker  was skeptical  about the quality  of the data that 
lay behind the money puzzle. For one thing, M1 is subject  to large re- 
visions.  Furthermore,  a large discrepancy  has emerged  between  the flow- 
of-funds  accounts  and the national  income accounts,  with the former  in- 
dicating  a considerably  higher  personal  saving  rate. If the flow-of-funds 
accounts  are  correct,  either  GNP  is overstated  or national  income  is under- 
stated. However, as Robert Hall noted, the size of this discrepancy  is 
small  relative  to the  money-demand  shortfall. 
Phelps questioned  whether,  as the typical M1 equation  implied, the 
short-run  money-demand  function  should  be more inelastic  with respect 
to interest  rates  than the long-run  demand  function.  He said that  it might 
well be the other  way around:  if the Federal  Reserve  sold bonds,  people 
might  at first  consider  the sale to be a temporary  change  and they would 
hold them without  much  hesitation,  anticipating  that the Fed would buy 
them  back.  Later,  when  they  realized  otherwise,  they  might  sell the bonds, 
driving  rates  up further.  Tobin pointed  out that  this analysis  assumed  im- 
plausibly  that  people  changed  their  money  holdings  primarily  to speculate 
in this way. But William  Poole noted that money  holdings  would change 
unexpectedly,  as a mirror  of such  unexpected  speculative  outcomes.  For- 
mally,  he found  this similar  to a surprise  change  in the money  stock,  which 
would at first  appear  in the error  term in a stochastic  cash-management 
model. 
Christopher  Sims was impressed  by the performance  of the equation 
in which  lagged  prices  were  used in explaining  money  demand.  He noted 
that  if the equation  were  converted  into  real  terms,  it would  imply  a strong 
effect  of the current  rate  of change  of prices  on real  balances,  which  could 
reflect  either  the effect  of inflation  on the demand  for real  balances,  or a 
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questioned  this equation  because  it implied  a substitution  of commodities 
for demand  deposits  when the heart  of the problem  lay in the shift  from 
demand  to time deposits,  a shift that ought  not to have been affected  by 
inflation  because interest  rates were subject  to ceilings.  While Sims did 
not want to argue  strongly  that a stable single-equation  estimate  of the 
demand  for money had been found in this equation,  it did lead him to 
believe that allowing  for a more general  lag distribution  on prices  in Ml 
equations  was a promising  avenue  for further  investigation. 
An alternative  summary  of the discussion  was provided  by Robert 
Lawrence: 
Said  Tobin,  J., with  sage  advice, 
"I'll  solve  the problem;  I'll solve  it nice. 
Look at the cash  that  banks  demand 
That  corporate  borrowers  keep on hand." 
"I  seek  it here,  I seek  it there; 
That  demand  for  money,  it's  just  nowhere." 
Said  Wachter,  M., "It's  to be expected. 
Like  the Phillips  curve,  it's  been  deflected. 
To be rational  and  not deranged 
It is the question  that  must  be changed." 
"I seek  it here,  I seek  it there; 
That  demand  for  money,  it's  just  nowhere." 
And Walter  Salant,  that  bold gallant, 
Proclaimed  the solution  as transparent. 
"Your  economy's  closed,  just  like your  mind, 
You'd  best  go abroad  to get  out of your  bind." 
"I  seek  it here,  I seek  it there; 
That  demand  for  money,  it's  just  nowhere." 
Then  R. J. Gordon  displayed  his stealth 
By suggesting  it would  be found  in wealth. 
"I  know  it's  me that  you'll  be thanking 
When  you learn  S&Ls  are  in branch  banking." 
And Edmund  Phelps  (who sometimes  helps 
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Said,  "If  you will  just  let me  talk, 
I'll tell  you V takes  a random  walk." 
William  Poole kept  his cool, 
And then  to save  the  money  rule 
Said,  "If  you  really  want  to catch  it 
Build  exponential  decay  into  your  ratchet." 
"I  seek  it here,  I seek  it there; 
That  demand  for  money,  it's  just  nowhere." 
Said  Houthakker,  Hank,  "I'll  just  be frank, 
The  flow  of funds  is just  a prank. 
To find  the answer,  the correct  decision 
Is to wait  until  the  next  revision." 
"I seek  it here,  I seek  it there; 
That  demand  for  money,  it's  just  nowhere." 
His beard  a-bristle,  his face turned  red, 
Our  author  grimaced  and  then  he said, 
"There  is nothing  that  you will  find 
That  I've  not tried  when  so inclined. 
"I  did  it all, at least  that's  to my credit, 
I counted  every  single  debit. 
I tried  every  functional  form 
Even  one that  resembled  a worm. 
"But  the  time  has  come  to give  up  the chase, 
To admit  that  it's  a hopeless  case. 
Oh,  Lord  Radcliffe,  tell me it's  all  idle chatter, 
And that  money  really  does  not matter. 
"I seek  it here,  I seek  it there; 
That  demand  for  money,  it's  just  nowhere." 